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Abstract
In my thesis, I examine how the Chinese government developed postcolonial apologia
throughout its dispute with the US government over policies related to COVID-19. I focus on the
shifting rhetorical strategies used by the Chinese government to defend China from accusations
by other nations, especially the US. I determine that the Chinese government's response to the
Western accusation during the COVID-19 pandemic progressively shifted from participating in
the Western system to questioning Western centralization and adding Chinese interpretations to
the existing world order. I argue that China's self-defense strategies altered in light of the
changing geopolitical context and became more assertive and confrontational towards Western
nations. The more aggressive version of this stance is what I have termed, "postcolonial
apologia," which I define as a self-defense rhetoric used by non-Western nations against the
West accusations. Specifically, non-Western nations use postcolonial apologia to openly resist
the colonial legacy of the Western-dominated world order, point out its dominance, and question
its universality.
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Ran 1

Introduction
On a Saturday during the last semester of my undergraduate career, my roommates and I
were afraid to leave our home. But, we had to make up our minds to go out shopping because our
food was almost exhausted. Four of us Chinese girls walked onto the streets of Denver, covered
our faces in winter scarves, pretending that we were Muslim women with masks inside the
scarves. This was my story of March 2020, the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic as the
virus spread rapidly all over the world from Wuhan, China. We offended religious customs and
pretended to be Muslim women because we were rejected by Uber drivers several times because
we were Chinese people wearing masks. Previously, a white kid in downtown Denver treated me
with a shooting gesture when I was hanging out evidently because I was Chinese.
My roommates and I were not the only victims. Since the COIVD-19 pandemic, many
anti-Asian crimes have broken out across the United States. In September 2020, an Asian woman
with mental disorders was beaten and raped by a group of adult and underage men in Milwaukee
(Kraemer, 2020); on March 12, a 26-year-old Asian woman was racially verbally abused and
sexually assaulted while waiting for a commuter train in San Jose (Medenilla, 2020). On the
same day, a 75-year-old Asian man was beaten to death by robbers in Oakland ("Second Suspect
Arrested in Fatal Oakland Assault, Robbery Of 75-Year-Old Asian Man", 2020). On March 15, a
64-year-old Asian man was pushed down and became half-blind (Yu, 2020). On March 16, a
mass shooting occurred in suburban Atlanta. Three shops owned by Asians were attacked,
resulting in the deaths of eight people, including six Asian women (Fausset, 2020). According to
an analysis released by the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State
University, San Bernardino, hate crimes targeting Asian people rose by nearly 150 percent in
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2020 (Yam, 2020). Karthick Ramakrishnan, the founder and director of demographic data and
policy research nonprofit AAPI Data, said in an interview with NBC that former President
Donald Trump's inflammatory racist remarks about the coronavirus have indeed played a role in
fostering hatred, such as repeated emphasis on the narrative that the virus originated in China,
and the elevation of the "Chinese virus" rhetoric (Yam, 2020). US Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo has repeatedly referred to the new crown virus as the "Wuhan virus" or "Chinese
coronavirus"; US National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien also stated, "I want to point out Yes,
this virus did not come from the United States, but from Wuhan, Hubei, China". Many Western
media and governmental officers have pointed out the virus's origin in China, blamed China for
bringing and spreading the virus, and called for China's apology for the pandemic expressly or
suggestively (Fox News, BBC).
As a result, the COVID-19 pandemic made China a focus of global scrutiny,
continuously accused as the source of the virus and its spread. According to daily news and
records updated on the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these
accusations came in spite of the unprecedented levels of communication and information coming
from the Chinese government, which maintained frequent video/telephone contact with most
countries in the world. Chinese leaders actively responded to the developments of various
countries related to the pandemic. They also reacted to the accusations and requests for apologies
from Western governments and the media. This global exchange between China and Western
government, especially the United States, is the basis of my thesis. In examining these responses,
I trace the ways Chinese officials sought to respond to Western accusations and the ways this
self-defense strategy shifted across time. During the protracted global public dispute, I argue that
the Chinese government gradually developed a strategy I refer to as "postcolonial apologia," a
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kind of self-defense that calls colonial assumptions and values into question. It should be noted
that this strategy of postcolonial apologia did not emerge overnight, but gradually formed in
various stages of dialogue with the US government. Indeed, much of this thesis is devoted to this
process of development and emergence and its subsequent deployment by Chinese officials.
Indeed, as of April 2022, when the whole thesis entered the final stage, the Chinese government
is still using the postcolonial apologia frame for diplomatic relations with the US government.
As a result, in my thesis, I seek to examine how the Chinese government developed the
postcolonial apologia throughout its exchanges with the US government and the emerging
international situation. Put differently, I seek to examine why and how the Chinese government's
response to the Western accusation during the COVID-19 pandemic has progressively shifted
from participating in the Western system to questioning Western centralization and adding
Chinese interpretations into the existing world order. I attend to the ways that China's selfdefense strategies altered in light of the changing geopolitical context with a particular focus on
the ways that the Chinese apologetic strategies became more assertive and confrontational
towards Western nations. My broader goals in this thesis are to understand the development of
Chinese-US relations, and more importantly, to comprehend what role the Chinese government
is trying to play in the constantly evolving geopolitical context and what kind of values it is
delivering to the world.
Before exploring the rhetoric of the Chinese government’s response to the pandemic, the
timeline of COVID-19 should be briefly rehearsed. According to the COVID-19 archive released
by the WHO, the C.D.C. Museum COVID-19 timeline, and the Timeline of the Coronavirus
Pandemic published by the New York Times, on December 31, 2019, Wuhan Municipal Health
Commission, China reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia; thus, a new type of coronavirus
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was identified. On January 4, 2020, WHO announced on social media that a group of pneumonia
cases had occurred in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, and there were no deaths. China publicly
released the gene sequence of COVID-19 on January 11. Then on the 13th, a COVID-19 case
appeared in Thailand, which was also the first overseas case. C.D.C. confirmed the first U.S.
COVID-19 case in Washington State on the 18th. On January 23, Wuhan was closed down. On
January 31, the Trump administration tightened U.S. border access, and many airlines suspended
Chinese routes.
On February 10, the cumulative number of deaths in China increased to 908, which
exceeded the number of deaths caused by SARS in the world. As Italy became a global COVID19 hotspot, the Italian government issued Decree No. 6 on February 23, 2020, and locked the
country. On March 11, The World Health Organization announced that COVID-19 is a
pandemic. On the 13th, President Donald J. Trump declared a nationwide emergency. On the
15th, various states in the United States began to shut down to prevent the spread of the virus.
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson became the first national leader to be infected on March 27
and moved into intensive care on April 5. Two days later, at the White House press conference,
the C.D.C. announced the mask-wearing guidelines and recommended that everyone wear masks
outside of the home.
On April 8, Wuhan was unblocked. On April 10, the United States surpassed Italy as the
world leader in reported deaths from COVID-19 (23,036 deaths). In June 2020, the global spread
of COVID-19 accelerated, with an average of 100,000 new cases per day. On August 16, the
C.D.C. began to develop a plan for the distribution of vaccines. On August 22, the number of
people who died from the COVID worldwide exceeded 800,000. On September 22, the number
of deaths in the United States exceeded 200,000, more than any other country. On October 2,
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President Trump was diagnosed with COVID-19. On December 3, after Biden came to power, he
required Americans to wear masks for 100 days. On December 11 and 18, the F.D.A. approved
the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines.
It is not difficult to recognize that COVID-19, as a long-term global pandemic, has had
an enormous impact on all aspects of all countries in the world. As of early 2022 (January 10),
the total number of COVID-19 infections worldwide has reached 309M, and deaths have reached
5.49M. Most countries are now in a significant recession. The International Monetary Fund
estimates that the global economy will shrink by 4.4% in 2020 and described this decline as the
worst since the Great Depression in the 1930s (Jones, 2021).
However, throughout history, humans have battled pandemics, from the earliest
documented Antonine Plague to the ongoing COVID-19. Major pandemics have always been the
giant enemy of human development. Huremović (2019) records the history of infectious diseases
in detail in "Brief History of Pandemics (Pandemics Throughout History)." According to
Huremović, Antonine Plague took place in 165-180 and took 5M lives. The plague of Justinian
erupted five times in total, 541-544, 557-558, 572-574, 590, and 599 AD. The first outbreak
caused the death of 1/3 of the total population of the Byzantine Empire, and the population
dropped from about 40 million to 26 million in Constantinople alone, and 40% of the inhabitants
died. The plague killed an estimated 25 to 100 million people worldwide and reduced the
European population by about 50% between 541 and 700. Black Death, which broke out between
1347 and 1353, caused about 75 million to 200 million deaths worldwide, making it the deadliest
pandemic in human history. There were between 30% and 60% of the population died from the
Black Death in Medieval Europe. Smallpox was the deadliest disease in 18th-century Europe,
removing about 400,000 people's lives each year and killing nearly 90 percent of Native
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Americans. In total, smallpox killed 56M people. Later, 100,000-150,000 people were killed in
the late 1800s. Spanish Flu killed 40M-50M people in 1918-1920. And HIV/AIDS has killed
25M-35M people since its discovery in 1981. More recently, SARS killed 770 people in 20022003; Ebola killed 11,000 people in 2014-2016, and MERS killed 850 people from 2015 to the
present (Huremović, 2019). And the COVID-19 pandemic we are in now has killed 6.2M people
until April 16, 2022, since 2019 (CDC, 2022). While each pandemic takes human lives, it is also
accompanied by great changes in human society. Therefore, the pandemic has always created a
unique context worthy of input by scholars in various fields. The COVID-19 we're in right now
is no exception.
While many of the consequences of pandemics can be seen in terms of public health or
economic issues, there were also important shifts in global relationships and the various public
postures of nations. For example, the Plague of Justinian, which reduced the population of
Europe by about 50%, was one of the reasons why the Arabs were able to conquer large tracts of
land on the southern Mediterranean coast with little effort (Frerichs, 2002). Similarly, in Plagues
and Peoples, historian William McNeil (1998) argued that Spain's conquest of the Aztec Empire
with a population of millions by fewer than 600 troops also benefited from the smallpox
pandemic at the time.
In this thesis, I want to see how international relations, national identity, and national face
are being changed in a rapidly changing context like COVID-19. My purpose in this thesis is to
explore these changing relationships in terms of the national rhetorics employed in the global
dialogue around the pandemic and China’s responsibility and role in relation to it. I seek to
pursue these changing rhetorics by discerning a variation on national self-defense rhetoric that is
inflected through postcolonialism. In order to engage this project, I focus on the official
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statements of the Chinese government during the first several months of the COVID-19
pandemic and the ways these statements responded to accusations from the West and, especially,
the U.S. I pay particular attention to the ways the discourse around COVID-19 was shaped and
influenced by changing political and geopolitical conditions and the ways that national identity
played a key role.
In addition, it needs to be stated in advance that because I am a rhetorician, not a public
health scholar, I know that I have no qualifications or position to comment on public health
work; therefore, I will focus on the rhetoric of the Chinese government's response, rather than the
Chinese government's strategy for pandemic prevention and control itself. So, my research
approach is largely descriptive not designed as a critique or judgment.
My thesis consists of three key chapters. In Chapter One, I lay out the core theoretical
issues of the thesis and provide an initial context of the COVID-19 pandemic. I first provide a
brief review of Chinese-US relations since the founding of the People's Republic of China (1949)
until COVID-19. In addition, I mention the context of the Chinese government's domestic
COVID-19 prevention and control work. After establishing the big picture of Chinese-US
relations and China's pandemic prevention and control work, I examine existing literatures
related to the rhetoric of self-defense, or apologia. Next, I sketch the core components of relevant
postcolonial perspectives. Following these reviews of literature, I offer a conception and
framework of postcolonial apologia. After developing this framework, I introduce my texts and
the way I will analyze these texts.
In Chapter Two, I examine the apologetic frame towards allegations from the U.S.
government in the Chinese government's early stage, the Trump administration. I divide this
frame into two stages. The first stage is from February 2020 to July 2020, during which time the
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Chinese government constructed a rhetorical frame emphasizing a global rhetoric of a "Shared
Future for Humankind," and used two strategies, 1) A focus on "Scientific Language and
Strategy" and 2) "Blaming the Western for Politicizing the Pandemic Strategy." The second stage
entails August to November 2020. External dynamics of foreign policy complicated responses to
COVID during this stage. Controversies over the South China Sea occurred in late July, and the
US closed the Chinese Consulate in Houston, and then China closed the US Consulate in
Chengdu. During this period, the Trump administration took on an even more aggressive
accusatory stance and the Chinese government responded with what I refer to as the "Mirroring
of Western Accusatory Rhetoric Frame." During this stage, the Chinese government shifted to
responding to accusations directly. So, when a Trump official insisted that Chinese-US relations
have been problematic since Nixon, Chinese officials offered a divergent interpretation of that
history. And, when Trump officials consistently insisted that the Chinese government was not
representative of the Chinese people, Chinese officials made similar observations about the
Trump administration.
Chapter Three focuses on what I see as stages three, four, and five. At the stage three, I
analyzed the apologetic discourse of the Chinese government after Biden defeated Trump to
become the 46th President of the United States and converted it into a Reset Frame, and adopted
three strategies: 1) Erasing Trump Strategy, 2) a mirroring of Biden's "Build Back Better"
Strategy, and 3) projecting a new path forward strategy. These strategies sought cooperative
Chinese-US relations from the Biden administration. And at the stage between the Anti-China
Act Strategic Competition Act of 2021 was proposed and passed, the Chinese government
immediately switched from a reset frame to a Strategic Silence Frame, adopting a wait and see
attitude while the new US president developed foreign policy. The policy adopted by Biden was,
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however, much the same as the aggressive strategy of the Trump administration. Right after the
Strategic Competition Act of 2021 was officially passed, the Postcolonial Apologetic Frame was
finally adopted. The Chinese government used two strategies: 1) being openly Resistant Western
Hegemony and 2) offering a Chinese Interpretation of Western Ideology in order to question the
Western centralization and challenge the world rules by adding Chinese perspectives and values.

The Conclusion of this thesis seeks to draw insights from these dynamic shifts in
apologetic orientations for the study of postcolonialism and international rhetoric. It also
acknowledges the limitations of the present work and suggests future avenues for further
exploring apologia, postcolonialism, and the rhetoric of global public health.

In summary, in my thesis, I analyze the self-defense rhetoric of the Chinese government
in their responses to Western accusations and to test how a postcolonial apologia emerged
gradually. On the one hand, I want to understand how Chinese-US relations have developed in a
rapidly changing geopolitical context during the pandemic. On the other hand, I want to add a
postcolonial perspective to the rhetorical analysis of apologetic discourse, to explore the
possibility of apologia being weaponized as a resistance to Western centralism in a broader
sense. The COVID-19 pandemic has been a strenuous test of global relations and practices.
Sadly, it is not likely to be the last such test.
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Chapter One:
Contexts, Texts, and Methodology
The focus of the present thesis is on the arguments between Chinese and Western,
especially U.S., officials regarding China's efforts to prevent and contain the COVID-19
pandemic. At the heart of this broader global dispute are accusations leveled against China by
various western officials and the statements offered by China as self-defense. I approach the
situation through the rhetorical lens of apologia, but with an important twist. Where traditional
apologia theory posits a common cultural grounding, I am interested in the ways global apologia
plays out in relation to differential cultural dynamics of postcolonialism. Thus, in my thesis, I
seek to examine the emergence of a self-defense discourse that employs postcolonial critiques as
a way to not only defend the accused nation but also call into question the broader systems of
global power.
In this chapter, I lay out the core contextual and theoretical foundations for the analysis to
follow. Initially, I offer an overview of the history of Chinese-U.S. relations. Next, I provide a
brief history of COVID-19, the emergence of the virus in China, and initial efforts by the
Chinese government to deal with the danger. After providing this historical context, I turn to the
theoretical foundations for my analysis. I review the research of rhetoric scholars on apologetic
discourse. I then list the work of postcolonial scholars to explore the heritage and meaning of the
postcolonial perspective. Combining these areas of scholarship, I offer a definition of
postcolonial apologia. Finally, I also furnish an explanation of the texts that I will analyze in the
following two chapters.
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Brief Background of Chinese-US Diplomacy
In order to better understand and analyze the rhetoric of Chinese-US diplomatic exchange
during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is necessary to review the history of Chinese-US diplomatic
relations.
The Council on Foreign Relations has continuously recorded and updated major ChinaUS diplomatic events since the founding of New China in 1949 on a web article called
“Timeline: U.S. Relations with China 1949–2022”. I use the information recorded on this
website and other news to review Chinese-US relations.
Since the founding of New China in October 1949, Chinese-US diplomatic relations have
been going back and forth between the two extremes of cooperation and near-conflict. When
Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China in Beijing in
1949, the United States supported Chiang's ROC government retreat to Taipei, which was also
"setting the stage for several decades of limited U.S. relations with mainland China" (“Timeline:
U.S. Relations with China 1949–2022”, 2022). With the Korean War breaking out in 1950,
China and the United States became enemies, which further deepened the hatred between China
and the United States for each other. Then, in 1953-1955, the Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out
between China and the United States when Washington signed a mutual defense treaty with
Chiang’s Nationalists. The March 1969 Chinese-Soviet border conflict, which resulted in
Moscow replacing Washington as China's greatest threat, provided an opportunity for
reconciliation in Chinese-US relations.
The Ping-Pong Diplomacy of April 1971 was a major breakthrough in Chinese-US
relations. The Chinese Ping-Pong team invited members of the American team to China and the
team became the first Americans allowed to enter China since1949. In July of the same year, US
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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger secretly visited China. In October, the United Nations
recognized the People's Republic of China, giving it a permanent seat on the Security Council,
and the People's Republic of China replaced the ROC's representation of China in the United
Nations. During Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, he met with Chairman Mao and signed
the Shanghai Communiqué, which allowed China and the United States to discuss thorny issues,
especially the Taiwan issue, and laid the foundation for improving China-US relations. In 1979,
U.S. President Jimmy Carter granted China full diplomatic recognition, while recognizing the
one-China principle in mainland China and severing normal relations with Taiwan. Before long,
however, the United States and Taiwan continued to maintain commercial and cultural ties, and
Washington provides defensive weapons to Taipei.
In October 2000, President Clinton signed the China-US Relations Act, realizing
permanent normal trade relations between Beijing and the United States. Between 1980 and
2004, China-US trade went from $5 billion to $231 billion. In 2006, China surpassed Mexico to
become the second-largest trading partner of the United States, after Canada. In September 2008,
China overtook Japan to become the largest holder of U.S. Treasuries, worth about $600 billion.
China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in August 2010.
In November 2012, Xi became China's top leader. On June 7 and 8, 2013, President
Obama and President Xi attended the "Shirt Sleeve Summit" at the Sunnylands Estate in
California. Obama and Xi have vowed to build a "new model" of relationship, a nod to Xi's idea
of a "new type of major power relationship" for the U.S. and China. During the 2014 APEC
summit, President Obama and President Xi issued a joint statement on climate change, pledging
to reduce carbon emissions. On May 30, 2015, China and the United States had a dispute over
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China's reclamation work in the South China Sea ("US Calls For Land Reclamation 'Halt' In
South China Sea", 2015).
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency put Chinese-US relations into an even
more tumultuous state. On February 9, 2017, after winning the presidential election, U.S.
President Trump broke with convention by calling Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen,
questioning the U.S. commitment to the one-China policy. Trump later said in a call with
President Xi that he would abide by the one-China policy (Wertime, 2017). On March 22, 2018,
the Trump administration announced sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports worth at least $50
billion ("Trump Orders Stiff Tariffs On China, In Hopes Of Cutting Trade Gap By $50 Billion",
2018); China imposes retaliatory measures in early April on a range of U.S. products. In July, the
trade war escalated in an all-around way. The United States imposed tariffs on various Chinese
products, and China accordingly raised tariffs on American goods. In October, U.S. Vice
President Mike Pence said in a speech that the U.S. would put competition over cooperation by
using tariffs to fight "economic aggression" ("Vice President Mike Pence's Remarks On The
Administration's Policy Towards", 2018). The trade war intensified in 2019, with the Trump
administration raising tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods to 25 percent from 10
percent. In retaliation, China announced plans to impose tariffs on $60 billion worth of U.S.
goods. On November 27, 2019, Trump signed a bill in support of Hong Kong protesters. Chinese
officials condemned the move, imposing sanctions on several U.S. organizations and suspending
visits by U.S. warships to Hong Kong.
On January 15, 2020, President Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He signed an
agreement to ease some U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports, a breakthrough in a nearly two-year
trade war between the world's two largest economies. On January 31, 2020, amid the first reports
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of a novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China, the Trump administration barred all non-US
citizens who had recently visited mainland China from entering the United States. Both Chinese
and American leaders have blamed each other for the outbreak. In April, Trump accused the
WHO of being biased against China and halted U.S. funding of the organization. In July 2020, as
a diplomatic conflict escalated, the United States ordered China to close its consulate in Houston,
Texas, claiming it was a center of espionage and intellectual property theft. China condemned
the order and retaliated by closing the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. July 23, 2020, US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech titled "Communist China and the Free World’s Future",
marking a profound shift in US diplomatic policy towards China. He declared that the era of
engagement with the Chinese Communist Party was over, condemning its unfair trade practices,
intellectual property theft, human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and aggression in
the East and South China Seas. He called on Chinese citizens and democracies around the world
to pressure Beijing to change its behavior and respect the rules-based international order. On
January 21, 2021, on Trump's last day in office, Pompeo announced that China was committing
crimes against humanity and genocide against Uighurs, a Muslim ethnic group mainly from
China's Xinjiang region. Biden's secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, also affirmed Pompeo's
statement. The Chinese government denies that a genocide is taking place. After Trump's term
ended, Beijing imposed sanctions on 28 former administration officials, including Pompeo, for
what the foreign ministry described as "crazy behavior" that "severely undermined U.S.-China
relations."
After a brief review of the Chinese-US diplomatic history, it is not difficult to find that
there are contradictions and conflicts between China and the United States in various fields.
Among them, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea issue, the trade war, the intellectual
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property issue, and the Xinjiang and Hong Kong issues are the most prominent. Chinese-US
relations have reached the brink of rupture several times, but they have also pulled back from the
precipice and avoided danger. Terry Lautz (2016), a scholar of Chinese-US relations, believes
that even if the China led by the Communist Party has moved in a different way than the US
originally envisioned, every US leader has agreed that "a prosperous and peaceful China is a
better alternative than a poor and angry China", and assume that economic prosperity will
eventually lead China into "the direction of market capitalism", and a "pave the way to Westernstyle freedoms". In addition, John Pomfret (2016), in his The Beautiful Country and the Middle
Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present, evaluates the ongoing Chinese-US
relationship as "a Pattern of Enchantment and Despair". He described in an interview with The
New York Times that "Americans and Chinese have been enchanting each other and
disappointing each other since they first met in 1784, when the first U.S. ship landed in
Guangzhou with a cargo of American-grown ginseng and silver to trade for tea. If there's a
pattern to the relationship, it has been rapturous enchantment followed by despair” (Wong,
2016). The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a new space for the development of Chinese-US
relations, allowing place all other topics under this space. Therefore, it is of profound
significance to discuss Chinese-US diplomacy in this new space.
After reviewing the historical relationship between China and the United States, I would
like to briefly introduce the Chinese government's pandemic prevention and control work, which
will allow us to better understand the reason and the root of Western allegations against the
Chinese government.
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China's pandemic prevention and control work
While the exact timeline of the COVID-19 outbreaks and the responses by the Chinese
government are part of the overall dispute, I will here try to lay out a simple outline of the major
events. In March 2020, the Chinese government and WHO co-hosted a briefing to share China's
experience in fighting the pandemic and release the timeline of the Chinese government's
pandemic prevention work called “Timeline of China releasing information on COVID-19 and
advancing international cooperation on pandemic response”. My review in this section is based
primarily on that timeline, as well as some other news records.
The first report of confirmed cases in mainland China was on December 1, 2019. On
December 26, Zhang Jixian, a doctor of respiratory and critical care medicine in Wuhan, first
discovered and reported the pneumonia of unknown cause, and suspected that the disease was an
infectious disease. Afterward, a large-scale outbreak of the disease occurred in Wuhan
(Shangguan, 2020). On December 31, the Wuhan Municipal Health and Health Commission
issued the "Wuhan Municipal Health and Health Commission's Circular on the Current
Pneumonia Epidemic in Our City", stating that 27 cases had been found. The Chinese
government informed the World Health Organization of the situation on the same day. On
January 4, 2020, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issued the "Work Manual for
Medical Treatment of Unexplained Viral Pneumonia" to the hospital, which stipulates the
reporting of suspected cases. On January 6, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and
Prevention launched the second-level emergency response to public health emergencies (major
public health emergencies). On January 7, President Xi presided over a meeting of the Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and put forward requirements
for pandemic prevention and control. On January 9, the National Health Commission's Wuhan
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Viral Pneumonia Pathogen Preliminary Evaluation Expert Group officially announced that the
pathogen was a new type of coronavirus. On January 15, the Chinese Center for Disease Control
and Prevention launched a first-level emergency response to public health emergencies (supreme
major public health emergencies) and announced that human-to-human transmission of the virus
could not be ruled out.
Since January 14, 2020, Wuhan City has used infrared thermometers at airports, railway
stations, and other public transportation stations to monitor the body temperature of passengers
leaving Wuhan. On January 20, after the screening kits were distributed and widely used in
clinical testing, a large number of confirmed cases began to be reported in other parts of
mainland China outside Wuhan, including Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai. On the same day,
Wuhan established a new coronavirus pneumonia pandemic prevention and control headquarters.
On January 21, Wuhan Mayor Zhou Xianwang and China's National Health Commission called
on people to stop entering and leaving Wuhan. On January 23, the Wuhan New Coronary
Pneumonia Epidemic Prevention and Control Headquarters announced the adoption of blockade
and isolation measures in the pandemic area. On January 24, 30 provinces, autonomous regions,
and municipalities in mainland China successively launched Level 1 emergency response to
supreme major public health events. On January 25, the National Health and Medical
Commission set up 6 medical treatment teams with a total of 1,230 medical workers to assist
Wuhan. As of January 30, all inter-provincial routes to Hubei have been suspended. Ten
provinces and cities including Hubei and Beijing have completely suspended road passenger
transport, 16 provinces have completely suspended inter-provincial passenger routes, many cities
in 28 provinces have also suspended or partially suspended urban bus routes, and 5 cities
including Wuhan have suspended urban rail lines.
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In late February, many provinces and cities in mainland China had no new confirmed
cases for several consecutive days, and many places lowered the emergency response level and
gradually lifted the closure of cities to facilitate the approval of enterprises for resumption of
work and production. On March 12, the National Health Commission of the People's Republic of
China announced that in general, the peak of the current round of the pandemic in mainland
China has passed. On March 23, Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China and head of the Central Epidemic Response Team, announced that the spread
of the local epidemic in China, with Wuhan as the main battlefield, has been basically blocked.
On March 26, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and the
National Immigration Administration issued a public temporary suspension of entry by
foreigners with currently valid visas and residence permits. On the same day, the Civil Aviation
Administration of China also issued an announcement restricting each domestic and foreign
airline to only one flight to any country per week, and may further tighten it. On March 31, due
to the impact of the pandemic, for the first time in the history of the national college entrance
examination, there was a large-scale temporary adjustment, which was postponed for one month.
Since then, there has been no nationwide outbreak in mainland China, and small-scale outbreaks
caused by overseas imports have been staged. In conjunction with the big data tracking of
citizens' travel history by the health code, local governments have implemented regional
blockade strategies for small-scale pandemics and ensured the normal life of most people by
blocking medium and high-risk areas.
Efforts to contain this infectious virus were, ultimately, unsuccessful and as of the date of
this writing, COVID-19 remains a major public health issue around the globe. The specifics of
the public health responses around the globe are beyond the scope of the present thesis. What is
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at issue is the question of how this outbreak sparked on-going geopolitical tensions, disputes, and
accusations that have undoubtedly interfered with global cooperation and effectiveness. From a
rhetorical perspective, the discourse of accusation and self-defense is understood in relation to
the classical Greek concept of apologia. In the following section, I review the key scholarship
related to this concept.
Literature review of apologia
Every culture develops norms of how someone is accused of wrongdoing and how those
accused individuals are expected to defend themselves. The ancient Greeks used the term
apologia for speeches of self-defense and that term has been adopted by many scholars of
rhetoric who are interested in the various ways individuals, organizations, and nations seek to
defend themselves and their public image from accusations of wrongdoing. Although it is the
root of "apology," apologia has a broader connotation than an apology. Apologia entails all the
options for defending oneself, emphasizing the response to accusations and the narration from
the perspective of the accused, the "telling its own story from the accused's standpoint rather than
just apologizing" (Downey 42); while an apology is mainly for seeking forgiveness (Hearit,
1994), and it is only one stance/form of apologia. In this part, I will briefly review the history of
apologia, and then sort out the main views of contemporary rhetoric scholars on apologia studies.
Sharon Downey (1993) explains the evolution of apologia's function in Western
civilization and divides its historical development into four stages: classical, medieval, modern,
and contemporary periods (contemporary periods are also divided into two parts, the first is until
the 1960s, the second is after the 1960s). In the classical period, apologia was a judicial
procedure. After being charged, the accused had to give a self-defense speech to the General
Assembly, and the persuasiveness of the speech directly determined the institution's vote on
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whether the defendant was guilty or not. If the defendant was found guilty, s/he shall be
sentenced immediately. In this case, the speech was diametrically related to the punishment s/he
received, so the function of apologia, in Downey's words, is self-exoneration, that is, to escape
punishment as much as possible (46).
In the medieval period, apologetic speech no longer had a decisive effect on the
defendant's sentence, and apologia occurred more often after the accused was found guilty. So,
the purpose of apologia became purification with religious meaning, to "convincing oneself of
the forgiveness of God" (48). Purification was considered the rationale in which apologia
functions at the interpersonal level. When apologists in the medieval period tried to purify one's
sin through self-defense speeches, the modern apologia "functioned as self-sacrifice" (52).
Downey believes that the rapid changes in social structure and revolutionary spirit are the
central themes of modern apologia, so the accused are often revolutionaries who fight against the
ruling class. Therefore, modern apologia had more elements of martyrdom and self-sacrifice.
The accused tried to influence more audiences to raise their revolutionary spirit through their
self-defense speech as well as their own sacrifices. As a result, they achieved their goal that calls
on more people to join the struggle against the dark ruling class (50-52). Although Downey
defines the function of modern apologia as self-sacrificing, it is not difficult to find in his
description that the core of modern apologia is resistance: the resistance of the oppressed class to
the ruling class, and the disintegration and reorganization of the social structure. And such
apologia is more offensive than defensive. This conception of a more offensively oriented
apologia will be crucial to my development of a postcolonial apologia, which combines selfdefense with critiques of existing power relations.
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The apologia of the contemporary period practiced this critical feature even more
frequently (54). In contemporary apologia before the 1960s, due to the emergence of mass
communication, the object of apologia had shifted from the plaintiff to the mass audience
because the attitude of public opinion may be more important for the accused. And it was
precisely because of this demand for manipulating public opinion that contemporary apologia
had been politicized, thereby alleviating the requirement for self-defense (55). The need for
image repair and restoration became more pressing in American politics starting in the 1960s
after a series of political scandals that occurred after the 1960s caused the public to distrust
politicians and doubt their ability to govern. In Downey's opinion, the contemporary apologia
after the 1960s used the public's ignorance of the whole picture of the event, combined with the
media's narrative ability, to manipulate and distort the authenticity of the event, to guide the
public opinion to satisfy its own political goals (58). Therefore, politicians were faced with a
large number of innuendo accusations mixed with true and false in various media. They would
continuously be in a state of defense and take "not apologizing" as the primary posture. Not only
that, because the source of these accusations cannot be captured, the apologia of this era also
showed the property with no specific object of apology. As a result, rather than treating that
apologetic discourse as a self-defense speech, the apologia of this era has become a stage for a
deduction. Apologists and the media perform their duties to manipulate public opinion.
While Downey seeks to trace the development of apologetic rhetoric, most other scholars
have focused their efforts on developing taxonomies of apologetic strategies. For instance, in
Kenneth Burke's redemption theory, he "ties apologies to the religious aspects of guilt and
redemption—which, ultimately, help reestablish social order" (Towner 435). Burke (1970)
believes that the essence of purification is to eliminate guilt. There are two ways to stop guilt,
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namely mortification and scapegoating. Mortification is to admit one's crimes, and accepting
corresponding punishments compensates for the internal sins through external punishments. And
scapegoating (or victimage) is to shirk the sin to others or let others take the punishment for
oneself. In addition, Burke also proposes a "non-redemptive" purification method called
transcendence. Unlike the premise of redemption, which is to admit wrongdoing, the essence of
transcendence is to deny the existence of mistakes and therefore reject guilt.
The four factors of apologetic discourse proposed by Ware and Linkugel (1973) show
some resonance with Burke, namely (1) denial, (2) bolstering, (3) differentiation, and (4)
transcendence. According to Ware and Linkugel, the first factor is denial, denying alleged facts,
sentiments, objects, or relationships (275). And the denial strategy works only when it does not
violate the audience's value orientation and does not form a known distortion of reality. There is
also the denial of "intent". Because when the audience agrees that the result is not intentional, the
accusation will be alleviated. The second factor is Bolstering. Contrary to denial, bolstering
requires reinforcing facts, sentiments, objects, or relationships (277). At the time the accused
reemphasizes their own specific experience, they can bring the audience to their role and make
the audience empathize with them, allowing the audience to understand and even agree with their
choices. The third one, differentiation refers to "any strategy which is cognitively divisive and
concomitantly transformative" (278). And this one can only be effective when the new meaning
claimed by the accused is very different from the old meaning held by the audience. The last
factor is transcendence, which refers to placing the event in a larger context that the audience did
not know before (280). For example, there is a massive conspiracy behind a minor incident.
Similar to differentiation, this strategy also allows the audiences to realize their limitations and
ignorance by providing a world unknown to them so as to reconsider their accusation and
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evaluation of the accused. While proposing four self-defense factors, Ware and Linkugel also
identify four postures or stances. They argue "speech of self-defense..., use either denial or
bolstering, coupled with either differentiation or transcendence" (13). So these four stances are
Absolutive: Denial and Differentiation
Vindictive: Denial and Transcendence
Explanative: Bolstering and Differentiation
Justificative: Bolstering and Transcendence (13).
For many rhetorical critics, contemporary apologia focuses on defending one's public
image and these scholars have worked to develop more nuanced descriptions of the nature of this
impression management. Following Downey, William Benoit (1995) proposed that the essence
of apologetic rhetoric is image repair; that is, individuals or groups "reduce, redress, or avoid
damage to their reputation (or face or image) from perceived wrongdoing" (p. vii). The typology
of image restoration strategies proposed by Benoit is based on two assumptions. First,
communication is a goal-directed activity (63). Second, maintaining a favorable reputation is a
key goal of communication (67). There are five strategies. The first one is Denial. The accused
can simply deny, that is, refuse to admit that s/he did a wrongful act. Or s/he can also find
victimage or shifting the blame to someone else (75). The second strategy is evading
responsibility, which consists of four methods. The first is provocation, that is, the accused
claims that its wrongdoing is a response to other people's wrongful act (76). The second method
is Defeasibility, that is, the actor debates his/her lack of information, volition, or ability, so s/he
should not take full responsibility for the error (76). The third is that the accused provides
information to prove that his/her mistake was based on an accident that s/he cannot control (76).
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The last method is the accused claim that s/he should not take full responsibility because s/he is
based on good intentions rather than evil (77). Continuing back to the strategy itself, the third
image restoration strategy is reducing offensiveness, that is, "a person accused of misbehavior
may attempt to reduce the degree of ill feeling experienced by the audience" (77). And this
strategy consists of six parts. Bolstering refers to increase positive feelings by emphasizing the
accused's good reputation, thereby reducing negative feelings. Minimization is to persuade the
audience that the negative act is not as bad as they think. Differentiation means that by
comparing with other similar but more offensive act, the accused's act is not so bad.
Transcendence signifies that placing the wrong act in the broader context. Attacking accuser is to
question the credibility of the accusation by reducing the reputation of the accuser.
Compensation is the defendant's initiative to make compensation to alleviate negative feelings
(77-78). The fourth strategy is, Benoit calls Corrective action, which refers to the defendant's
claim that s/he will correct the problem, restore the situation to its previous state, or promise
changes to prevent it from happening again (79). The last strategy is Mortification, where the
accused admits the mistake, assumes responsibility and hopes to be forgiven (79-80).
Recently scholars have begun shifting attention away from individuals or corporations
and begun focusing on the apologetic rhetoric of nations. These scholars have noted that in the
international context the function of apologia often changes from a simple repair of image to
attempts at reconciliation (Koesten, Rowland, and Villadsen). Specifically, Villadsen proposed
the concept of official apology to correspond to the reconciliatory goal of apologies, while
Edwards (2005) proposed community-focused apologia, "which begins the healing process
between communities" (449). Melissa Nobles (2008) applied this content to the field of
international relations. She believes that official government apologies can "help change the
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terms and meanings of national membership," and she pointed out that in international affairs,
"the power of apologies… is that they not only publicly ratify certain reinterpretations of history,
but they also morally judge, assign responsibility, and introduce expectations about what
acknowledgment of that history requires" (2-3). Scholars who specialize in political apologies
even propose to treat the reconciliatory goal of apologies as a sub-genre of apologia (Koesten
and Rowland, Villadsen, Edwards), which is enough to prove how different Apologia's research
is to the group, organizational, community, or even international level, from the previous
research. And scholars realize that "political apologies are understudied" (Dodds 140), but at the
same time, "the apology has become a form of political speech with increasing significance and
power" (Luke 344). There are still many scholars who have made significant achievements on
this road. Edwards proposed a concept of community-focused apologia, which is different from
the previous apologia: "a speech act directed toward communities— organizations, races, ethnic
groups, even nation-states" (318), and it is for repairing the relationship between groups. At the
international level, apologizing for historical crimes is conducive to build a better image and
participates in international affairs more smoothly (319), and "political leaders could use words
of forgiveness to heal the wounds of the past and seek redemption that will lead to the
progression of mankind at both the national and international level" (Glynn 17).
Similarly, Ellwanger (2012) conceives of apologia as having the rhetorical potential to
realign political relationships. Unlike interpersonal apology, Ellwanger argues that the public
apology is not to seek forgiveness but to respond to the need for reconciliation. He believes that
the analysis of public apologies should be on power relations instead of only focusing on the text
(308). By measuring the power relation between the public and the offenders (especially those
who did not violate the law but made a moral error), Ellwanger realized that the purpose of the
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offenders being asked to apologize was not to be provided forgiveness, but to create a public
humiliation platform through his/her statement to force the offender to be educated to accept the
ideology of the masses, which in Ellwanger's words: Metanoia— a profound conversion of the
heart (310). For example, let people who express hate speech accept multiculturalism. Nobles
(2008) also proposed apologia as providing a platform for changing relationships. Focusing
specifically on apologia in international relations, Nobles argues that official apologies provide a
platform that can announce "new policy directions and promote social reconciliation" (111).
While the above suggests how robust research on apologia has been within rhetorical
studies, some have noted weaknesses. In "Apologia, Image Repair, and Reconciliation: The
Application, Limitations, and Future Directions of Apologetic Rhetoric," Towner (2008)
systematically analyzes 91 apologetic rhetoric articles published in academic journals in the past
40 years, making statistics on the author, subject, focus, region, etc. She proposes four
limitations of the apologia areas. She believes that the field lacks: ① steady, yet
disproportionate growth; ② insufficient female representation; ③ overemphasis on oration and
traditional media; and ④ lack of non-Western voices (451). As Towner stated, "our heavily
Western-based theories and understandings are not yet inclusive enough to be applied in these
areas" (458). This bias toward Western perspectives on apologia is also noted by Mark Gibney,
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Niklaus Steiner. They argue that "the
apology may be the West's version of the truth commission, as it focuses on issues of justice,
political guilt and redemption, and establishment/reinvention of civic norms" (2). These goals
and functions of apologia all presuppose the political values of Western democratic states and, in
this way, can distort our understanding of official apologies, especially as the operate in
international relations.
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In order to respond to Towner et al's inquiry, this thesis seeks to explore apologetic
rhetorical from a non-western perspective, especially with the angle that is resistant to westerncentrism, which I will call the postcolonial apologia. Focusing on the accusatory and apologetic
discourse employed by Western nations and China during the global COVID19 pandemic
requires a perspective that can move beyond and critique this Western bias. My efforts to explore
the dynamics of this global rhetorical exchange, therefore, requires a perspective that can
decenter Western thinking and engage Chinese apologetic efforts from a non-Western
perspective. Before outlining this perspective, I provide a brief overview of the key works in
postcolonialism that inform my perspective.
Literature review of postcolonialism
In this section, I will mainly explore the development of postcolonialism by examining
four foundational texts in this area of study: Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, Edward
Said’s Orientalism, and Gayatri Spivak’s "Can the Subaltern Speak?", and Homi K. Bhabha's
The Location of Culture. Following this review, I turn to Ming Dong Gu's Sinologism: An
alternative to Orientalism and postcolonialism to explore the development of postcolonialism in
the Chinese context. Having established the core tenets of postcolonialism and the ways they
have been taken up in the Chinese context, I examine the ways postcolonialism has been taken
up by scholars in relation to public health. Finally, I turn to Raka Shome's work to integrate
postcolonial theory into rhetorical studies.
In what many regard as one of the first postcolonial treatises, The Wretched of the Earth,
Frantz Fanon (1961) inspiringly proposed to reflect on the relationship between colonizer and
colonized, which was regarded as the precursor of the entire postcolonialism. He explained the
logic of the influence of colonists on the colonized from the exposition of colonial history.
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Specifically, he believed that colonization divides the world into two halves, the colonizer and
the colonized (38). The colonizer used cannons and weapons to open the gate of the colonized,
which made the colonizers appear to be a more advanced human being. The culture of the
colonized, by contrast, was understood as poor because they failed to invent the technology that
can protect themselves. This kind of "advanced human being", or as he pointed out that "the
governing race is first and foremost those who come from elsewhere, those who are unlike the
original inhabitants, 'the others'" (40). So, the emergence of the colonizer, was never just as a
foreigner, a non-dominate "other", a role that can be assimilated without being valued, but an
advanced civilization, a leader from outside. Therefore, when advanced civilization entered the
land, all the previous cultures of the colony were denied. Only advanced civilization was good,
and other indigenous cultures were bad, backward, and immoral. Fanon described, “He (the
native culture) is, let us (colonized people) dare to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense
he is the absolute evil. He is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he is the
deforming element, dis- figuring all that has to do with beauty or morality; he is the depository of
maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind forces" (40). It was
precisely because of the extreme decay of the native culture that this place was reduced to a
colony; in reverse, it was precisely because of Western civilization's extreme correctness that
Western people can become rulers and colonizers. Such a complete denial of the native culture
naturally led to the "non-human" rhetoric in the colonized. The indigenous people were regarded
as brutal, dehumanized, animal, and inferior. In fact, the terms used by settlers when referring to
natives were zoological, "he speaks of the yellow man's reptilian motions, of the stink of the
native quarter, of breeding swarms, of foulness, of spawn, of gesticulations” (42). As shown
here, the concepts about skin color, race, and discrimination also began to appear at that time,
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“the black, brown, and yellow masses which soon will be unleashed" (43). Fanon also mentioned
that the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer was fixed and opposed to each
other. This antagonism came from the exploitation and plunder of the colonized by the colonizer,
as well as the envy and desire of the colonized towards the colonizer's life. In this sense, the
colonists displayed the colonized a vision of what a "superior life" is, and the colonized accepted
this definition, and “there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself
up in the settler's place” (39), which turned out develop this "want to be" jealousy. Later, when
the entire decolonization movement took place, the cultural connotations that the colonizers
spread to the colonized made the colonizer driven out of the colony. What Fanon suggested here
was "the well-known principle that all men are equal will be illustrated in the colonies from the
moment that the native claims that he is the equal of the settler... he (the western culture) has
already decided to reject him (the colonizer) and to take his place" (44-45). But in fact, what the
colonized people cannot see was that they were actually arming themselves with the values in
Western culture. In other words, they have been co-existing with Western values perpetually
since then.
Fanon’s thesis of the impact of colonialism on the cultural politics of both colonizer and
colonized has proven immensely influential and numerous scholars have worked to expand on
this dichotomy. Edward Said, another influential postcolonial theorist, has worked to create a
richer sense of the distinction between colonizer and colonized by exploring cultural depictions
of the “Orient” as a perpetual other to the colonizing “West.” In Orientalism, Said (1979)
defined Orient not only from the geographical level, the "adjacent to Europe", but also as
"Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies", a land of wealth plunder, and the "other"
mentioned in the Western world (1-2). As for Orientalism itself, he gave three definitions. The
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first was any research on the Eastern world as a Western scholar, that was, "an academic
one, ...Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient-and this applies whether the
person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist——either in its specific or its
general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism". The second definition
was the way of thinking as the contradictory to the "Occident", the "Orient" was a view that was
opposed to the "Occident" (2). The third definition was what Said wanted to investigate in this
book: Orientalism was the authoritative ruling of Eastern culture from a Western perspective:
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with
the Orient-dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it,
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short. Orientalism as a Western
style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (3).
From the above three definitions, especially the third definition that Said wanted to emphasize,
Orientalism itself was not an independent study of the East, but a Western gaze, a colonial gaze
on the Eastern world, an illusion and fantasy. What Orientalism expressed and represented,
according to Said, that part "culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with
supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies
and colonial styles" (1-2). Examining the consequences of this mode of discourse, Said noted
two key dimensions of Orientalism.
First, it needed to be clear that the concepts of "Orient" and "Occident" discussed here
were not a geographical (5), but symbolically constructed by human society, the history,
intention, and cultural connotations. Therefore, Orientalism was not a pure fantasy of the Eastern
world in Europe, but a created body of theoretical and practical systems. More importantly, "the
continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted
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grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness" (6). Second, Said introduced the
concept of cultural hegemony raised by Gramsci. He distinguished between civil and political
society that political society uses force to make people obey; while civil society uses schools,
families, institutions and other organizations to make people follow voluntarily. In Gramsci's
words, it is consent (7). And the formation of consent is through culture. Cultural hegemony
means that a certain view plays a dominant role in a society. In other words, people consent to
practice a certain culture.
In this sense, Said’s Orientalism refers to the cultural hegemony of Western culture in the
Eastern world. Because Western culture has penetrated into institutions and systems itself
through colonization, the people in the colonies have internalized this culture and voluntarily
consent to the cultural practice. Orientalism is, essentially, a form of Eurocentrism because the
process of colonization created the assumption that the Western was more advanced; an
argument similar to Fanon’s. The cultural hegemony of European culture towards non-European
societies makes European culture define itself as "us", correspondingly, non-European culture is
"those". Moreover, this concept constantly reaffirms that Europe is superior and advanced to the
Eastern world. As the consequence, this hegemony eliminates any possibility of doubting and
challenging may arise against European culture.
According to Said, Eurocentrism formed a worldwide cultural hegemony through the
process of colonization. Furthermore, by distinguishing "us" and "those", the view that European
culture is advanced culture is consolidated. And because of this cultural hegemony, European
culture has become an authority and has the qualification to judge those non-European cultures
are inferior, primitive, dehumanlized, something should be discarded. In other words, the West
has the right to speak in the entire world, has become the referee of the entire world, and has set
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the standards of the society. This is still the case when we return to the context of today's world.
The world’s highest film awards, music awards, also for literature, art, technology, and sports are
all judged by the Western world. Not only that, university rankings, academic achievements, and
even the modern national system itself are all products of Western culture. The entire nonwestern world is working hard to meet the standards specified by the Western world.
Unlike Fanon and Said, who both use binary to treat the whole world as two fixed parts
and analyze the relationship and influence between the two parts, the deconstructive feminist
scholar, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak was more concerned about the impact of colonization.
Based on the theories of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, Spivak proposed the concept of
"subaltern" and explored who the subaltern is, the influence of colonialism, and the discourse
power of the subaltern. In order to explain the discourse power of the Subaltern, Spivak (1983)
introduced a traditional Indian religious ritual, “sati” in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”. Sati was a
controversial Hindu practice of widow burning, which was seen as cruel and inhumane.
However, when the widows have the “power” to make their choice, or in other words, speak
their voices, they still cannot get rid of the burning since they would choose to be burn
voluntarily. Because in Hindu culture, the literal meaning of “sati” is not “widow burning” but
“good wife” (60), and sati is a "reward" only for a good wife (56). As a result, for a widow to be
a good wife meant that she must willing to be burned. When a widow says that, yes, she wants to
be burned, which seems like her own voice. But in fact, she just wants to be a good wife, while
being burned is the way to be a good wife. Nevertheless, when the British colonized India, the
British abolished this ritual, which was usually understood as "White men saving brown women
from brown men” (50), even if Indian widows want to be burned to death.
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The question Spivak raised, in this case, is, can the subaltern such as Indian widows
speak? In fact, the widows’ own voices never come out. White British people define sati as a
backward and decadent cultural practice according to their own cultural understanding. By
abolishing sati, thinking that they have saved Indian women, this is undoubtedly a manifestation
of cultural hegemony because white British people have become the judge to whether the
indigenous culture is criminal. In this sense, the subaltern failed to make their own voice. But
when the widows speak out and choose to be burned to death, is this their real voice? Their wish
is to be a good wife, and being burned to death means to be a good wife. But they are not the one
connects being burnt to death and being a good wife. Through the case of sati, Spivak is actually
reflecting on the disequilibrium of discourse power. Subaltern, that is, people who have lost
discourse power, cannot truly make their voices. I summarize the reasons discussed by Spivak
into three points. First of all, the concept itself, or the creation of knowledge, has been controlled
by those who have the discourse power, as described in sati, the power of defining what it means
to be a good wife in this culture. Secondly, even if the subaltern makes a voice, there is no
channel to be heard. The third point is that people who have power cannot really have empathy
with the subaltern, and cannot really understand the situation of them because they have the
power, but will make decisions for the subaltern according to powered people's wishes just like
the British colonists in the case of sati. This observation is critical for thinking about discourses
of global public health where, once again, the voices of colonial, western powers can become so
dominant as to erase the experiences and perspectives of the formerly colonized.
Contrary to Spivak’s pessimistic attitude towards the colonized’s inability to speak, in his
The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha (1994) believes that the relationship between the
colonizer and the colonized is not who is shaped by the who, but how hybrid cultures emerge
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through the collision of colonizer and colonized. Therefore, from his perspective, Eastern and
Western cultures are not binary and fixed, but mutually influencing and flowing: "discrimination
between the mother culture and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the trace of what is
disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something different – a mutation, a hybrid" (159).
Hybridization is really about how you negotiate between texts or cultures or practices in a
situation of power imbalances in order to be able to see the way in which strategies of
appropriation, revision, and iteration can produce possibilities for those who are less
advantaged to be able to grasp in a moment of emergency, in the very process of the
exchange or the negotiation, the advantage... It's not about people who eat Chinese food,
wear Italian clothes, and so on; but sometimes, in a very complimentary way... it's been
taken to mean some kind of diversity or multiple identities ...hybridization is a discursive,
enunciatory, cultural, subjective process having to do with the struggle around authority,
authorization, deauthorization, and the revision of authority. It's a social process. It's not
about persons of diverse cultural tastes and fashions (Olson and Worsham 39).
In terms of the present study, Bhabha's emphasis on the fluidity of hybridization provides a key
insight into how discourses, like those surrounding global public health, might be transformed
through enunciation and struggle.
In addition to cultural hybridity, Bhabha also debated the agency issue of the colonized
from the meaning of theory. First of all, he believes that theory is not simply a product of neocolonization and imperialism of the Western elite, but politics and theory are also hybrids,
“Speaking in the name of some counter-authority or horizon of ‘the true’ ..., the theoretical
enterprise has to represent the adversarial authority ... which, in a doubly inscribed move, it
simultaneously seeks to subvert and replace” (33). Then Bhabha proposed a colonial
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contramodernity that resists the linear narrative in historicism. He holds that an "an 'enlightened'
colonial or postcolonial subject" can break the linear narrative, forming "a fragmented,
simulacrum, and imitative postmodern", thus confirming cultural contingency and textual
uncertainty, and also changing in the process of modernity and progress in our understanding of
narrative, in other words, the "values". Therefore, “postcolonial critical discourses require forms
of dialectical thinking that do not disavow or sublate the otherness (alterity) that constitutes the
symbolic domain of psychic and social identifications” (248).
Postcolonialism is perhaps best understood as a huge field of discourse, or a collection of
theoretical criticisms, in which all discourse practices are based on such a historical fact of
European colonialism (also includes a series consequences of colonization). Fanon's binary of
colonizer and colonized opened a precedent for reflection on colonization. Within this binary of
colonizer and colonized, Said added the discussion of "us" and "those", and clarify the study of
cultural hegemony, Eurocentric theory as the core to ponder the imbalances power relation in the
colonization. Spivak focused on the impact of colonialism on the colonized, more specific, the
voice-making of the colonized/subaltern. While Homi Bhabha put forward a decolonization and
confrontation perspective more from the lens of the cultural hybridity of the colonizer and the
colonized. At this point, the entire logic of postcolonialism has been completed. This logic is not
only limited to reflections on colonialism studies, but has also been applied to a broader field,
any discussion about power, discourse, and voice.
When postcolonial theory was introduced into China, Chinese scholars criticized and
further developed it, reframing it in relation to the Chinese context. Ming Dong Gu, a Chineseborn American literary scholar proposed "Sinologism" as an alternative theory of Orientalism
and postcolonialism in the Chinese context. The reason why Sinologism is necessary, Gu (2013)
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explained, is that unlike other colonies, China had never been completely colonized by the West,
and this objective historical premise must affect the Westerners and the Chinese themselves to
recognize and perceive Chinese culture and society (3). In addition, Gu firmly believes that
Orientalism and postcolonialism are both too politically oriented, and too much about ideology,
thus limiting their explanatory power. Therefore, by proposing Sinologism, Gu hopes to explore
"how to conduct China-West studies and cross-cultural studies and produce knowledge about
China in ways as free from the interference of politics and ideology as possible" (3). Gu pointed
out that the Western narrative of China presents two extremes of distortion: one is positive
worship and idealization; the other is negative alienation and demonization. For centuries, the
West’s understanding of China has always shifted from one extreme to another, with few and
objective descriptions (16). Chinese scholars' cognition of China also presents two similar
extremes. Some scholars abide by Chinese traditional culture is an advanced civilization with a
long history, thus completely resist Western culture, and vigorously advocate Chinese traditional
culture; another part of scholars, since the Opium War, China was forced to open the country,
due to the influence of the colonial context, and like other colonies people, they think that local
culture is a backward civilization, and Western culture is an advanced civilization, so they
wantonly slander Chinese society and culture. Therefore, such a comprehensive Chinese
knowledge system formed by the various subjective and contradictory impressions of China from
the West and the non-West was named Sinologism by Gu (18).
Gu attributed the emergence of Sinologism to two reasons: "cultural unconscious" and
"alienation of knowledge" (8). Specifically, the "cultural unconscious" is an unconscious force
that influences epistemology and methodology in academic research. The use of the dynamic
model of "cultural unconsciousness" can explain the crisis and the current complex conditions of
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modern Chinese consciousness. First of all, in modern times, the contradiction between Chinese
intellectuals' recognition of Western values and nostalgia for Chinese traditions appears to be a
conflict between "reason" and "emotion", but in essence a conflict between conscious and
unconscious. Secondly, since the reform and opening up, the inferiority complex in the "cultural
unconscious" of Chinese people has appeared in the form of belittling Chinese culture and
traditional values, even in the field of Chinese studies (36-37). In order to explain the inferiority
complex in the field of contemporary Sinology, Gu further proposed that the contemporary
"cultural unconscious" is rooted in colonialism. Due to the 500-year history of colonial
expansion, its influence is everywhere in the world. Colonialism led non-Western peoples to
experience deep spiritual colonization. So the cultural unconscious appeared. The "alienation of
knowledge" directly means that knowledge is subjectively misinterpreted. Gu believes that,
unlike Orientalism, Sinology’s initial boom originated in the West’s attempts to establish a
global knowledge system that encompasses China. The emergence of Sinology and Greek
studies had equal status in the beginning. Therefore, the early days of Gu argue Sinology was a
golden age without alienation. By tracing the history of China-Western cross-cultural
communication, Gu believes the obvious signs of knowledge alienation did not appear until the
actual transformation period of the 20th century accompanied by the expansion of imperialism
and colonialism (66-67). In the colonial context, the narrative of knowledge needs to serve the
colonial action. As a result, pure cultural exchange is given political significance, and the
alienation of knowledge begins.
Having reviewed the basic theories of postcolonialism as well as an alternative theory in
the Chinese context, I now turn my focus to discussions of postcolonialism within public health
field and health communication studies.
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More and more public health scholars realize that the West dominates public health
discourse, which serves as an accomplice of imperialism (Richardson, 2019). Thus, in public
health studies, many scholars have begun to study the decolonization of public discourse and
there is an urgent call for non-Western perspectives to be incorporated into public health area. In
"Imperial or postcolonial governance? Dissecting the genealogy of a global public health
strategy”, by tracing the genealogy of the WHO global strategy, and research into the debate on
infectious diseases, Brown and Bell (2008) argue that in public health discourse, on the one
hand, globalizing makes some non-Western countries "are being captured or 'enframed' by the
integrative ambitions of a western 'imperial' vision of global health". On the other hand, by
offering a postcolonial perspective, they claim that 'integration' is more complex, because of the
subtle and dynamic relations of power that exist between the West and non-West. And the
'integration' should not be simply understood as Westernization, but perhaps should be added to
the perspective of hybridity. In "On the coloniality of global public heath", Eugene Richardson
(2019) explores how the West engages in "bourgeois empiricist" models of disease causation
through hermeneutic injustice based on empiricism by analyzing misinformation about the
Congolese Ebola disease reported by western media, "which serve protected affluence by
uncritically reifying inequitable social relations in the modern/colonial matrix of power and
making them appear commonsensical” (101). Health communication scholars Sastry and Dutta
(2012) take HIV/AIDS as an example to evaluate the paradox in the expression of emancipatory
discourse in PEPFAR, which is” situated within a logic of militarization, privatization, and trade
liberalization that fundamentally underlie the unequally high burdens of HIV/AIDS risks among
the global poor” (530).
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Before concluding my review of postcolonialism, it is worth considering the ways this
body of theory has been taken up in rhetorical studies. In order to explore this engagement, I will
begin by examining the efforts of Raka Shome to bring a postcolonial perspective into rhetorical
scholarship. I conclude this section by reviewing recent rhetorical scholarship that has examined
the on-going COVID-19 pandemic within a postcolonial context.
Shome (1996) discussed the significance and the practice of postcolonial perspective in
rhetoric studies from three aspects: discursive imperialism, hybrid and diasporic cultural
identities, and postcolonial academic self-reflexivity. First, she believes that unlike the past
colonialism and imperialism that colonizers occupied native's land, contemporary imperialism is
more about “subjugating the 'native' by colonizing her or him discursively” (42), especially
through popular media and academia. In this western discursive imperialism, the inquiry of how
the West uses cultural text to structure and maintain power is very important. Therefore, rhetoric
studies are also urgently called on to join the study of postcolonialism. Second, she cited the idea
of Homi Bhabha's cultural hybridity and put forward the concept of diasporic identity: Shome
believes that precisely because culture is hybrid, the postcolonial subject is forced to become a
diasporic position, which “cultureless but cultured” (44-45). And at the same time, diasporic
position creates a non-hegemony space. Due to the cultural intersection, all cultures are hybrids
with each other, so there is no cultural hegemony, no "other" culture, but only shared meaning
(52). The third point raised by Shome is postcolonial academic self-reflexivity. She questions the
academia and believes that to approach postcolonialism, critics should self-reflex, unlearning
their own privileges and examine whether their research is legitimizing the hegemony of the
western power structures (47-48). So Shome proposed strategic essentialism, as a "political tool
that the postcolonial critic often has to adopt to resist any kind of hegemony", which refers to "to
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produce a critique of anything" (47). Shome finally gave rhetorical studies a mission, "the
postcolonial notion of diasporic cultural identity calls for rhetorical theories that are able to
address the rhetorical situations and experiences of disjunctured diasporic cultural identities"
(52).
Shome engaged the rhetorical situation of COVID-19 in her "The long and deadly road:
the covid pandemic and Indian migrants" published in 2021. In this essay, she discusses the
Indian migrant crisis in the context of the COVID pandemic. She believes that the pandemic has
opened up a "problem space" for the migrant situation in India, which she calls unequal
temporalities, the dilemma of im/mobility, and the challenge of recording death. In India, there
are a large number of internal migrant workers who do not have permanent jobs, and they travel
from the villages to the big cities like Mumbai and Delhi to participate in the short-term jobs.
Under the pandemic, the Indian government announced a three-week nationwide lockdown, and
those who go out will be punished. However, under the lockdown, internal migrant workers can
only walk home from the big city. Not only did the Indian government not give them time to go
home, but the police treated them cruelly since they violated the lockdown. These internal
migrant workers are generally Dalits (Scheduled Caste), Indigenous groups (Scheduled Tribes),
and lower-class Muslim populations (321). When the Indian government believes that lockdown
can protect all national people, they are forgotten because "forgotten are lives not seen as
valuable or lives that exceeds the frame of the 'national people'” (325). Shome believes that this
can reveal "the multiple and unequal temporalities that are actually at work in the Covid 19
situation (and in fact any disaster situation)" (326) and evaluate who is excluded from the
national people framework. Then Shome discusses im/mobility under the pandemic. She
understands that the binary between home and homelessness cannot be applied to migrant status
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since they are always between home and homelessness. Therefore, the fluid, mobile boundary
concept needs to be added to the discussion of migration. Shome states, "what is needed in this
pandemic is a multiscalar approach to im/mobility... (and) a political consideration of when and
what kinds of immobility might keep certain populations safe and when and what kinds of
mobility are needed to keep other populations safe” (327). Shome's third question is about the
record of death. She proposed that the COVID-19 death data only recorded the number of deaths
due to the virus, but the number of deaths due to the COVID-19 situation should also be
included, such as migrants who died on their way home according to the government's lockdown
policy. Therefore, the pandemic context requires us to update how we record deaths (332).
Shome concluded that it is not just viruses that kill people, "Non-recognition of, or negligence
towards, lives that exceeded the frame of 'human life' invoked by the state also killed many"
(332).
Like Shome, many rhetoric scholars have invested in research in the COVID-19 context.
In "Rhetoric and Reality of China's Global Leadership in the Context of COVID-19: Implications
for the US-led World Order and Liberal Globalization", Suisheng Zhao (2020) discusses how
Beijing can take advantage of the vacuum of the Trump administration abandoned the global
leadership, actively participating in global political governance, and strive to become a global
leader in the 21st century. Zhao evaluated how China competes for the discourse power with the
West by actively participating in international affairs, such as "China has brought statist
approach toward the international human rights governance", which enables China to claim that
the protection of human rights in developing countries is different from the Western approach,
“the Chinese government has asserted that human rights are first the rights of economic
development, not individual civil rights” (238). And in the context of the pandemic, China’s
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statist approach to human rights has gained worldwide attention due to China’s rapid control of
the virus spreading, which makes it possible that although the West still insists on such a method
to create a safer place for autocrat, China started to celebrate the "setback to the West's
monopoly on human rights discourse" (238).
Based on the heated discussions about rhetoric, postcolonialism, China, and the
pandemic, I also want to join this debate, trying to examine the Chinese government’s response
to the West during the pandemic by providing a concept of a post-colonial self-defense rhetoric.
More importantly, I want to inquiry how China competes with the West for discourse power,
how to sell Chinese values, and at the same time, to resist Western values.
After this broad review of apologia and postcolonialism, I believe that there are several
key works that are effective in my thesis. The first is the four factors of apologetic discourse
proposed by Ware and Linkugel: denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence, and four
stances: Absolutive, Vindictive, Explanative, Justificative as well. I use these factors and stances
to specifically evaluate the Chinese governmental apologetic rhetoric to understand what
methods they use and what they are trying to achieve. In addition, the apologia strategies
proposed by Benoit, I think, are also used in my textual analysis. Melissa Nobles' concept of
apologia's use of international affairs will run through my entire analysis. In the case of China's
response to Western accusations, however, these stances serve as more than just defensive
postures but, instead, encompass a postcolonial critique. While the Chinese government
employed strategies of transcendence and differentiation, these efforts are essential, a broader
resistance to Western hegemony. In this way, while I am seeking to examine apologetic stances,
I do so with postcolonialism as my theoretical perspective. Therefore, in my following analysis,
my focuses are mainly on how the Chinese government adjusts its apologetic frame according to
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different geopolitical contexts. More importantly, I inquiry how the Chinese government created
and realized a postcolonial apologia step by step, how it is to resist Western hegemony, and how
it decenters Western values and authority. Borrowing from Spivak, I seek to examine whether
China, as a colonized country, can speak on the global stage, or at least speak in a way that is not
inflected through Western values and expectations. I also want to discover how the Chinese
government’s response to Western accusations set the stage for future cultural hybridization in
relation to shared global concerns like human rights and global health. To this end, I introduce
the methodology I use and the justification of the text choice in the next section.
Methodology
In the thesis, I attempt to examine the dialogue between China and the United States in a
constantly updated geopolitical context during the COVID-19 pandemic with a linear record and
identify how the Chinese government crafted a postcolonial apologia. I focus on how official
Chinese responses to Western accusations. To clarify these terms, I provide two important
methodological definitions below: "postcolonial apologia" and "official statements."
Postcolonial apologia, I argue, refers to the self-defense rhetoric of the non-Western
against the West accusations, which raise questions about imperial cultural hegemony and the
centrality of Western values. Specifically, the non-Western nations resist the colonial legacy of
the Western-dominated world order by pointing out its dominance and questioning its
universality. In the case of the Chinese government’s response to Western accusations during the
pandemic, it was manifested by denying and attacking Western hegemony to gain a space that
allowed China to add Chinese interpretation to the discussions of COVID-19, global public
health, and the existing world order.

Ran 44
By saying "official Chinese responses," I refer to governmental statements made in
response to Western government and media related to the COVID-19. My timeframe begins on
February 15, 2020, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s interview with Reuters. This is the
first time the Chinese government responded to the West on COVID-19. And my analysis
concludes with the dialogue between China's national leader President Xi and U.S. national
leader President Biden on September 10, 2021. While there are many elements to "the Chinese
government," I will focus primarily on statements made by national leaders like President Xi and
through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was a section
called "Fighting COVID-19: China's Experiences in response to COVID-19", where government
officials publish all diplomatic news related to COVID-19, including but not limited to daily
press conferences, Chinese national leaders and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials' interviews
and speeches, and dialogues with government officials/scholars/international organizations of
other countries. I checked this section every day and saved all the responses from the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the United States. As of the lunar new year in 2022, this section
had disappeared from the Chinese version interface of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website,
replaced by a special section of "2022 Beijing Winter Olympics". In the English version
webpage, the content of this section is still being updated. There is new content published in this
section continuously, and old content will be removed by new ones. With a normal update
frequency, each post will stay in the section for about six months, after which it will be replaced
by updated content. I archived all the posts published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this
section from February 2020 to November 2020, a total of 632 posts. Starting in December, when
I became more explicit about the direction of my thesis, I began saving only the Chinese
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government's response to the West. The Chinese government's direct response to the West,
which I saved on the "Fighting COVID-19" section totaled 41 items, from February 2020 to
September 2021 when the top leaders of the two countries agreed to stop blaming each other and
to start a dialogue and cooperation (Chinese President Xi Jinping Speaks with U.S. President
Joseph Biden on the Phone, 2021). Even though the Chinese government was releasing
statements related to COVID-19 on other platforms, since these are posted on the official
platform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and compiled into a special section, it shows that
these responses are recognized by the Chinese government and can represent their diplomatic
attitude, officially.
I divided these 41 posts into five stages in chronological order and response strategy: the
first stage is from February to July 2020; the second stage is from August to November 2020; the
third stage is December 2020 to April 2021; the fourth stage is from April to July, 2021. And the
fifth stage is from July to September 2021. I analyze in detail the frames and strategies used by
the Chinese government at each stage in the next two chapters. (See visual aids below)
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I hope the introduction of my concept of postcolonial apologia will further decolonization
along two dimensions: global public health discourse and rhetoric studies. Firstly, I seek to
explore how China counteracts and decolonizes the global public health discourse which is
basically western-centered and monopolized through the analysis of the Chinese government’s
remarks during the pandemic. Secondly, I also hope to add a non-Western perspective to
rhetorical studies, more specifically, to studies of apologetic discourse, which is originally based
on the West as the intellectual subject and perspective. Put differently, by proposing a
postcolonial apologia framework from a Chinese perspective, I want to decolonize the rhetoric of
Western-centrism itself.
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Chapter Two:
From Denial to Mirroring: The Chinese Government's COVID-19 Response in the Trump
Administration
This chapter will cover the Chinese government’s rhetorical analysis of the U.S.
government’s accusation in the first two stages of the outbreak. I'm trying to examine how the
original Chinese government's apologia was crafted and how it adjusted to different geopolitics.
The first stage is from February to July 2020, and the second stage is from August to November
2020. The Chinese government adopted different frames in the first and second stages. I identify
the first frame as the Community with a Shared Future for Humankind frame. When the West
accuses the Chinese government of inappropriate intervention in pandemic prevention and
control, a concept of transcendence is put forward by the Chinese government: human beings
share the same earth, science is the common language of humankind, and the virus is the
common enemy of all humankind, so people should face it together instead of blaming each
other. Under this frame, the Chinese government uses different strategies depending on the
specific international situation and Western accusation. At the second stage, the Chinese
government used a different frame, which I identify as the Mirroring Western Accusatory
Rhetoric Frame. In this frame, the Chinese government countered the U.S. government
accusations by mirroring strategies that the U.S. government used against them. The third,
fourth, and fifth stage of this dispute utilize a different frame and will be discussed in more detail
in the next chapter.
In all the posts I have saved, Cui Tiankai's, Chinese Ambassador to the US, interviewed
with Margaret Brennan on CBS Face the Nation on February 10, 2020, was the first official
response by China to the US allegations. Then, on February 15, State Councilor and Foreign
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Minister Wang Yi participated in an interview with Reuters, in which he talked at length about
the Chinese response to Western accusations. On April 30, Vice Minister Le Yucheng's gave an
exclusive interview to the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) of the United States. On May
13, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an article entitled "The China-related Lies and Facts
about the New Coronary Pneumonia Epidemic", which responded in detail to almost all of the
allegations from the West. I believe these four texts constitute the first stage of China's
governmental response to the West about COVID-19 since at this stage only these four posts
made a direct response to the Western allegations. In this stage, there are two main rhetorical
strategies used by the Chinese government. The first one is public health and pure scientific
strategy, that is, the Chinese government advocates using pure scientific language to discuss the
outbreak. The second one is the Blaming the Western of Politicicizing the Epidemic strategy.
This meant the Chinese government pointed out that the West was politicizing the outbreak since
intelligence agencies, politicians, and media are discussing the virus instead of scientists. And
the virus should be a purely scientific issue, not a political one. In the following sections, I will
first explain the Community with a Shared Future for Humankind frame, and then use the four
responses mentioned above to explain how the Chinese government, by exporting the idea of a
community with a shared future for humankind, packaged the virus as an issue for all
humankind, so that people should use the common language, the medical one to talk about it,
thus targeting the West of the politicization of pandemic.
Community with a Shared Future for Humankind Frame
The community with a shared future for humankind is not a new concept created by the
Chinese Communist Party. It is reflected in the philosophies of the ancient East and the West. In
recent years, the concept of a community with a shared future for humankind has repeatedly
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appeared on the political stage around the world. It was adopted by the 55th session of the United
Nations Commission for Social Development on February 10, 2017, and written into a United
Nations resolution. It is also a core of the Chinese government's political ideology. In October
2017, "Building a Community with a Shared Future for ankind" was written into the Party
Constitution of the CCP. In March of the following year, "A Community with a Shared Future
for Humankind" was written into the preamble of the Constitution of the People's Republic of
China. According to Xi Jinping's definition in the report of the 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China, building a community with a shared future for humankind is to build
a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness, inclusiveness,
cleanness, and beauty. In the field of international relations and diplomacy, a community with a
shared future for humankind is considered to be a new direction of the diplomacy of the People's
Republic of China: this direction aims to provide the world with "Chinese solutions" and
"Chinese wisdom", make greater contributions to humankind, and also "Correcting and
transcending the modernization path, theory and system of the West since modern times"
(Nathan and Zhang, 2021). This idea is reflected in almost all Chinese diplomatic projects, such
as the Belt and Road Initiative, the multi-faceted work on the road of peaceful development
(Ding and Cheng, 2018). In the discussion of a community with a shared future for humankind, it
also explicitly denies the scheme of shaping the international system with the traditional Western
concept of power ("Full text of Hu's report at 18th Party Congress", 2012). In this diplomatic
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a community with a shared future for humankind has
undoubtedly become a core frame. Even though the specific strategies vary according to different
international situations, this frame guides the response throughout the first and second stages.
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Next, I will analyze how the Chinese government complete the first and second stages of
response within the framework of a community with a shared future for humankind.
Before starting my detailed analysis, I would like to provide a brief introduction to the
Western accusation against the Chinese government in the first stage. Western allegations
against China regarding the outbreak include, but are not limited to: Trump called COVID-19
"Chinese Viruses" ("Donald Trump's 'Chinese virus': the politics of naming", 2020); Pompeo
claimed that the Chinese government should pay for global economic devastation caused by the
pandemic, and the Chinese government was ineffective in fighting the pandemic and concealing
the truth about the pandemic (Wingrove, 2020); the Trump administration has accused the virus
of originating in China and suggested it was due to a lab leak (Sadarizadeh and Robinson, 2020).
According to Wang and Catalano, the Trump administration's tactics during the COVID-19
pandemic, including naming as the "Chinese virus," have effectively increased anti-China and
anti-Chinese government sentiment, which has led to a high level of hatred against Chinese and
Asian Americans in the United States, and has also deteriorated Chinese-US relations, weakened
the possibility of Chinese-US cooperation during the pandemic, and “the spreading of conspiracy
theories that undermined control of the pandemic” (333).
In the face of these specific accusations against it, the Chinese government articulated
their rhetoric of shared humanity through two specific strategies. The first was to define COVID19 within the language of medical science and public health and characterize it as a kind of
natural disaster that could have begun anywhere. The second strategy was to explicitly call out
the U.S. for seeking to politicize the virus. In the next few pages, I attend to the specifics of these
strategies and the ways they shaped the first stage of the geopolitical discourse around the
pandemic.
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1) Public Health and Pure Scientific Strategy
The first strategy used by the Chinese government is to declare that the pandemic is a
purely scientific issue and that people should use scientific language to discuss it. In the response
of the Chinese Ambassador to the US, Cui Tiankai, he focused on constructing a common world
and thus people should take a rational and common language, the scientific one to talk about the
pandemic. He denied the accusations that the Chinese government was negligent in fighting the
pandemic at the early stage. He (2020) believed that COVID- 19 is a new virus that people knew
very little about at the beginning, and people were still gradually deepening their understanding
of it, including its infection mode and transmission route, etc. He did not respond directly to the
accusations by providing what the Chinese government had done in the outbreak's intervention.
Instead, he started from the relationship between viruses and humans and believed that it takes a
process for humans to understand viruses. His response turned the West's accusations against the
Chinese government to the entire human-virus relationship.
Vice Minister Le Yucheng was also claiming that human beings should talk about the
pandemic through pure scientific language in an exclusive interview with NBC in April. Le
insisted that the virus is a natural disaster, and China received the first impact Through his
response, the discourse shifted from "China spreading the virus" to "China being attacked by the
virus," Le transformed China from an active "agent /carrier" image to a passive, attacked
"victim" image. On the one hand, the intention was denied, and on the other hand, China was
brought to the same position as all other countries in the world: a victim of the virus. Since the
virus was not created intentionally, and the whole world is the victim of the virus, no country
should be blamed. And when Le denied that China was the spreader of the virus, and tried to
paint China as a victim of the virus, what Le was implying was that China and all other countries
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were on the same spot, shocked by the virus passively. Le said, "some say that, for thousands of
years, humankind has been battling against all kinds of viruses, but never seems to be able to
claim an ultimate victory. Viruses can be really cunning" (2). Through the personalization of the
virus, the virus is very cunning and human beings have always fought against the virus but never
really won, the virus has become a more vivid carrier and an absolutely bad villain. Thus, the
hatred and blaming toward the Chinese/Chinese government turned to the virus.
State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi also used the strategy of public health and
pure scientific in the dialogue with Reuters. Wang repeatedly emphasized in the interview that
human society developed in the continuous struggle against the virus. He said "The epidemic
may happen in one country today and it may happen in any other country tomorrow. Public
health security is therefore a common challenge for the world” (8). The bolstering of this part is
to move the virus issue from the debate between China and other countries to a larger
framework, that of human beings and viruses. In this perspective, the Chinese, like other human
beings around the world, has been hit by the virus. And because the virus is cunning, it happens
in one country today and it happens in another country tomorrow. China just this time,
unfortunately, became the epicenter of the outbreak. Like all other historical eruptions in human
development, it has suffered the greatest wear and tear, not only should not be blamed but to be
sympathized with. To elaborate on this view, the Chinese government frequently cites the U.S. as
the epicenter of the H1N1 flu outbreak in 2009. Wang said, "When the H1N1 flu started in the
United States in 2009, the virus also caused serious damage, affecting 214 countries and regions
in the world" (8). His implication was that the United States was also the site of the outbreak
center and spreading the virus to the rest of the world, and China is just in the same situation that
the United States faced before. He went on to say, "the US also needs to look back and learn
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from the experiences and lessons. All in all, public health is a common subject for the entire
world. We need to work together to combine our strengths" (8). By mentioning the case of the
United States as the epicenter of the pandemic, on the one hand, he is saying that the pandemic is
a global public health issue that everyone should face together; on the other hand, he is implying
that the United States has also acted as a spreader of the virus before and has no right to blame
other countries. In "The China-related Lies and Facts about the New Coronary Pneumonia
Epidemic", in questioning the traceability problem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs quoted AIDS
was first reported by the United States, but no one thinks AIDS is an American virus; the Spain
flu only broke out in Spain, and the origin is not necessarily Spain to match China's current
situation with the historical pandemic, so as to try to gain the audience's understanding.
2) Blaming the West for Politicizing the Pandemic Strategy
The strategy of public health and pure science focuses more on the promotion that the
virus is a threat to the whole world and China is part of the world, so people should use a
rational, common language to discuss the pandemic, that is, pure scientific language. This effort,
however, did not silence the criticism of China or the accusations emanating from Western
governments, especially the Trump administration. These continuous accusations led to a second
strategy: Blaming the Western for Politicizing the Pandemic, which was more aggressive
because its focus was to refute the politicization of purely medical issues in the West. In other
words, the West is talking about the virus in the wrong language.
The Chinese government directly refutes the politicization of the pandemic by Western
politicians by citing literature published in Western scientific journals as rational, purely
scientific evidence. In "The China-related Lies and Facts about the New Coronary Pneumonia
Epidemic", the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used 14 pages to deny the accusation in the Western
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media one by one, with a total of 24 points. This article proceeds by listing "Lie or Myth" first
and then "The truth". In the truth section, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used numerous medical
journals and WHO regulations as evidence to disprove the politicization of the virus issue. For
example, in the responding about calling the new coronavirus "Chinese virus" and "Wuhan
virus", the truth part first listed that WHO's naming of viruses should not be linked with
"geographic location, personal names, animals or food populations, culture, population, industry
or occupation (such as legions)”. And then cited an article published in the journal Nature to
deny the insulting calling. Similarly, articles published in authoritative medical journal The
Lancet, Nature-Medical, and WHO spokespersons and pathologists' remarks were used as
evidence in denying that the virus came from a laboratory.
While Western scientific journals were heavily cited by the Chinese government as
evidence to refute Western allegations, the Chinese government was strongly accusing the West
of politicizing the pandemic by ignoring the voice of science. In Le’s interview, Frayer
mentioned the rumors in China that COVID-19 came from the US military and asked Le whether
China was using disinformation to respond to US intelligence agencies' disinformation. Le first
indicated China's efforts to fight the pandemic from the national level to the individual level and
described various social groups' works in great detail. Then he began to raise American
politicians' accusations of China's contribution to the fight against the virus based on
disinformation. Le said, "Try to put yourself in our shoes: how would you feel if you were the
Chinese people" ("NBC News Interview With China's Executive Vice Foreign Minister"). By
explaining the hard work of the Chinese in the fight against the virus, and the American
politicians criticizing China's work while the US pandemic prevention and control has been done
poorly, Le allowed the audience to feel in the position of the Chinese, which enables the
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audience to be able to have a more "Chinese perspective" understanding of this matter, and also
to resonate the anger of Chinese people and justify the decisions made by Chinese people. Later,
when Frayer mentioned that according to information from the U.S. intelligence service, China
had artificially lowered infection and death cases during COVID-19, Le denied U.S. intelligence
reliability. He cited the fact that the U.S. Intelligence Agency's accusation that Iraq has "weapons
of mass destruction", but the weapons have not been discovered so far. Worse, this false
information has brought disaster to the people of Iraq and the whole world ("NBC News
Interview With China's Executive Vice Foreign Minister"). Le's allegations are strong, especially
when he proved the point by enumerating Iraq events. Questioning and challenging the source of
information resist the West's discourse power directly because it undermines narrative
institutions' credibility. By directly pointing out that there are all politicians, intelligence
agencies, the media not scientists discussing the pandemic in the West, Le was trying to convey a
value that the West was politicizing the pandemic.
Le treated Western scientists and politicians very differently. When it comes to virus
origination, he denied the assertion that the virus came from a laboratory, substantiated his point
by citing research from the Lancet by virologists. At the same time, he criticized politicians, who
are economists and intelligent people for offering unfounded conjecture about the origin of the
virus. It is not difficult to find that in the blaming the West for politicizing the pandemic strategy.
Combined with the first strategy, the Chinese government's attempt to promote is that the
language of science, whether it comes from China or the West, is credible and correct, and it
should become a common language when discussing the pandemic around the world. However,
Western countries are the ones who ignored this correct and rational common language and
politicizing the pandemic.
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Just as I mentioned that the Chinese government has been emphasizing that the pandemic
has been politicized, the bigger conspiracy theory put forward by the Chinese government was
that the pandemic has been used by American politicians as a scapegoat for their own improper
governance. In Le's response, he pointed out that the reason why American politicians slander
and criticize China, accuses China of inadequate prevention and control of the pandemic, and
even take this opportunity to promote the China threat theory and frame hatred of China is
because American politicians did a poor job in their fight against the virus. China has become a
scapegoat for US politicians to cover up their failures. Under this circumstance, Le attributed the
accusations against China to the politicization of the pandemic in the U.S. and put the entire
discussion from China's response to the allegations in a larger context: the U.S. politicians
regarded China as the scapegoat for their failure in governance (not just for the inadequate
pandemic prevention and control but for the slowed development of the United States).
Similar strategies are used in discussions of larger issues. When asked about Trump's
"Anti- or Blame China" strategy in the re-election campaign. Le quoted the words of Chairman
Mao Zedong: "the first-order question in revolution is to discern the true enemies and true
friends." He pointed out that China is not the United States' enemy in fighting the virus, but a
friend who fights together. He hoped that American politicians can see clearly who is the enemy
and who is the friend. He said that since the National Security Strategy that the US issued at the
end of 2017 described China as a "strategic competitor", China has been regarded by the United
States as the biggest threat in development. The United States has never gotten rid of
competition-led international relations and has always believed that China's growth will threaten
the United States' status as a world superpower. However, what China proposed was a new
international order dominated by cooperation. Le said that making America great again and
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China's pursuing national rejuvenation was not in conflict. On the contrary, strengthening ties
and collaboration between the two countries could make both sides' ideals realized more quickly.
Le provided a new perspective, implying that the U.S. government has been politicizing
everything, and vilifying China, while China and the US could have win-win cooperation instead
of conflict and confrontation.
Similarly, in Wang Yi's response, he replied that it was a false proposition that China and
the United States would move towards a clash of civilizations because China has always
maintained that there is no superior and inferior within different civilizations. Different
civilizations should respect each other and learn from each other, which enables the continuous
development of human civilization. And those who advocate a "clash of civilizations" have the
subconsciousness of the theory of the superiority of Western civilization, because this implies
that the development of any other non-Western civilization is not allowed. China is exploring its
own development path, one that does not depend on colonizing other countries. The West should
not regard the non-Western path as a conflict with it and should allow and accommodate the
development of other countries (6-7). Wang points out that people who believe in a clash of
civilizations do so because they take Western culture over other cultures for granted. The selfsustaining development path that China is exploring is a route different from the existing
Western model, and such a path needs to be allowed. Therefore, the China threat theory is
nonsense. Because in fact, the West is the one who has been obstructing China's Non-Western
path, while China has never made any block to the Western development path.
In general, in the first stage, the early response to the pandemic, through the rhetoric of a
community with a shared future for humankind in its response the pandemic, the Chinese
government intends to put everyone in the world on the same big ship, and this ship has always
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had an enemy during its voyage: the virus. And by preaching that people should use more
credible, more rational public health and purely scientific language to discuss the virus issue,
accusing the West of politicizing the pandemic, and then repairing its own international image.
Mirroring Western Accusatory Rhetoric Frame
Throughout the first phase of the pandemic, China sought to push the global rhetoric
towards a shared response to the deadly virus and away from questions of political blame.
However, a series of events that seriously affected China-US relations occurred during the
summer of 2020. While most of these issues had nothing to do with the COVID-19 pandemic
directly, all articles related to these issues have also been included by the Chinese government in
the "Fighting COVID-19: China's Experiences in response to COVID-19" section as the Chinese
government's official response to events during the pandemic. These events had significant
impact on China's relationship to the United States and other Western governments. As a result,
the Chinese government had to change its strategies to deal with the new situation. In following
section, I attend to the ways that China's self-defense strategies altered in light of the changing
geopolitical context with a particular focus on the ways that the Chinese apologetic strategies
became more assertive and confrontational towards Western nations. In the face of this changing
context, the Chinese government's rhetoric shifted to a frame that, essentially, mirrored the
accusatory rhetoric of the US. This mirroring strategy was particularly evident in relation to the
Chinese response to accusations leveled by the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S. President.
Before examining the dynamics of this mirroring rhetoric, I will begin with a brief timeline of
the shifting China-US dialogue during this period.
On July 13, 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo publicly challenged China’s
behavior in the South China Sea, saying that many of China’s claims in the South China Sea
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have no basis in international law. The Secretary further urged relevant countries to oppose
China’s maritime claims. This statement quickly escalated tensions between the U.S. and China.
Then, on July 21, the U.S. requested China to close the consulate general in Houston within a
time limit, claiming that it was a place for the Chinese government to conduct intelligence theft;
on July 24, in response to the U.S. request, the Chinese government notified the U.S. to close the
consulate U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, China. On July 23, Pompeo delivered a speech at
the Nixon Presidential Library in California, stating that previous U.S. policies had failed to
change China and broadly rejected previously established diplomatic relations between China
and the United States. On the evening of August 6, U.S. President Trump signed an executive
order, asking the Chinese Internet company ByteDance to sell TikTok in the United States within
45 days, otherwise, the business would be banned in the United States. As Oliver Turner and
Juliet Kaarbo have observed, "US President Donald Trump brought unpredictability to the
relationship" between the US and China and that this unpredictability was not only through
policy changes but also through routine aggressive public statements (452). As these authors
note, "the most unpredictable feature of Trump's approach to China was his day-to-day rhetoric,"
which they characterize as impulsive, emotional, and provocative (453).
Faced with an increasingly emotional and confrontational US president and unpredictable
policy changes, the Chinese government was led to accept that the COVID pandemic was
becoming a political, rather than merely a medical issue. This shift leads me to identify the
second stage of Chinese apologetic discourse, from July 2020 to December 2020 when Biden
won the election. During this period, the Chinese government moved from a transcendence
attitude to a more aggressive attitude toward the West. While I see this shift as continuing to
operate within the framework of the rhetoric of Shared Humanity, I think it is qualitatively more
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aggressive. In my reading, at this more aggressive stage, I identify that the strategy used by the
Chinese government is mirroring the US government’s strategy. The specific content of the
mirroring is 1) mirroring the Trump administration's citing Nixon's remarks strategy to refuting
the American government's re-narrative of Nixon; 2) mirroring the Trump administration's
differentiation strategy by distinguishing between the American government and the American
people.
To justify my argument, I will focus on four posts by Chinese diplomats that directly
responded to the West during this period, namely “Interview on Current China-US
Relations“ given by State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Xinhua News Agency on
August 6, 2020; "Yang Jiechi's signed article on China-US relations" on the 7th; "Reviving the
Cold War is Anachronistic - Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng's Exclusive Interview with
Guancha.cn" on the 12th, and "Vice Foreign Minister Zheng Zeguang Attends a Dialogue with
Members" on the 16th of the United States Congress via Video link. Except for the dialogue in
which Zheng participated, the Chinese government did not accept any interviews with any
Western media in this stage, and the platforms they chose to launch a conversation and/or
publish articles were all Chinese media, showing obvious vigilance against the West. While they
maintained their Community with a Shared Future for Humankind frame, the content of their
speeches appeared to be more radical, presenting an attitude of reproach. These four responses
were all directed at the Trump administration's definition of China-US relations at that time, So,
I'll start with a short introduction of Pompeo's speech at the Nixon Presidential Library in
California on July 23, as it represents the main West's accusations during this period. According
to the Washington post at the time, Pompeo’s remarks were just one of a series of attacks on
China by the Trump administration. Pompeo's cabinet-level officials, Defense Secretary Mark
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Esper, Attorney General Bill Barr, and FBI Director Christopher Wray have been harshly critical
of Beijing at the same time (Lee, 2020). I would briefly distill out Pompeo’s core statements and
rhetorical strategies. Then I will analyze how the Chinese government refuted him and countered
the accusations of the period by copying Pompeo's rhetorical strategies.
Pompeo's speech at the Nixon Library mainly relied on two strategies, the first was to
quote Nixon's speech and interpret the speech as focusing on changing China; the second
strategy was to differentiate between the CCP and the Chinese people. By distinguishing
between the CCP and the Chinese people, Pompeo tries to turn the CCP against the Chinese
people, portraying the CCP as the threat of the whole world and the villain of dictatorship and
autocracy, while the US and the Chinese people stand together.
In response to the Trump administration's accusations and a series of actions that
undermined China-US diplomatic achievements, the Chinese government responded with a
rhetorical strategy that largely mirrored the strategy taken by Secretary Pompeo. Guided by the
frame of a community with a shared future for humankind, the core of the Chinese government's
response to the Trump administration at this stage is to copy the Trump administration's
strategies of indicting the Chinese government. When Pompeo cited and interpreted Nixon's
remarks to support his own arguments, the Chinese government similarly cited and interpreted
Nixon's remarks to refute Pompeo. When Pompeo tried to split the relationship between the
Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, the Chinese government used the same
strategy to accuse the Trump administration of being a spoiler of China-US relations and a threat
to world peace. In the following analysis, I will first review Pompeo's strategy in his speech, and
then analyze how the Chinese government's apologetic strategy refutes him through mirroring
his strategy.
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1) Citing Nixon's remark Strategy
Pompeo's speech at the Nixon Library had two focuses, claiming that the engagement
with China dismal failed, and calling for a new democratic alliance to be unanimous against
Communist China. He stated, “the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t
get it done. We must not continue it and we must not return to it” (Pompeo, 2020). And at the
end of the speech, he emphasized, "we can't face this challenge alone. The United Nations,
NATO, the G7 countries, the G20, our combined economic, diplomatic, and military power are
surely enough to meet this challenge if we direct it clearly and with great courage. Maybe it's
time for a new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies" (Pompeo, 2020).
To address these two themes, Pompeo's first core strategy was to quote Nixon's speech and
interpret the speech as focusing on changing China. He directly quoted Nixon's statement
"Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside of the family of
nations...The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus, our aim – to the extent we can, we
must in events. Our goal should be to induce change" (Nixon, 1967), and then Pompeo pointed
out "I think that's the key phrase from the entire article: ‘to induce change’” (2020). Interestingly,
When Nixon did not specify who the target of the change was, and who implement the change in
the article, but only expressed the requirement to change at the time, Pompeo framed Nixon's
purpose as to change China, and directly deduced that the intent of the US engagement with
China was to change China. However, America's transformation of China has not been
successful, so its diplomacy with China has failed.
The Chinese government refuted Pompeo's interpretation of Nixon's remarks by directly
citing Nixon's speech/article. As I mentioned above, Pompeo interpreted Nixon's phrase, "induce
change," as Nixon's intent to change China. Two weeks after Pompeo's speech, Yang Jiechi, the
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director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission general office in China published an article
directly citing sentences from the Shanghai Communiqué to refute Pompeo's misinterpretation of
Nixon's intentions: "There are essential differences between China and the United States in their
social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of
their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence” (1972). Yang chose to refute Pompeo's interpretation of Nixon's remarks by citing
the Shanghai Communiqué jointly signed and published by the two heads of state when China
and the United States established diplomatic relations. And Yang also added, "The Shanghai
Communiqué fully reflected the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and conformed to the
basic norms of international relations" (2020) to increase the authority of the sources he cited by
conforming to the factor of international law. By citing these two remarks, Yang proved that the
foundation of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States lies
in recognizing their differences and respecting each other's choices, thus refuting Pompeo's socalled purpose of engagement as to "induce change". Foreign Minister Wang Yi also quoted the
Shanghai Communiqué directly. Through the paraphrased document, Wang believed that the
core of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States was based
on respect for differences, rather than changing China as Pompeo stated. He directly pointed out
that “it is neither necessary nor possible for the two sides to change each other. Instead, we
should respect the choice independently made by the people of the other side” (Wang, 2020, p2).
To further prove that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United
States was not based on changing each other but on respecting each other, the Chinese
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government cited a large number of achievements in the engagement. Le clearly pointed out that
in the past 50 years of China-US exchanges the Chinese Communist Party has never been an
obstacle to the relationship between the two countries, but a leader and driving force of mutually
beneficial cooperation between the two countries. In Pompeo's logic, the core of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States is to change China, so
the China-US engagement has failed. To argue that the China-American engagement was a
failure and that the United States suffered from it, he said: "China ripped off our prized
intellectual property and trade secrets, causing millions of jobs all across America. It sucked
supply chains away from America and then added a widget made of slave labor. It made the
world's key waterways less safe for international commerce” (2020). China first refuted the core
of Pompeo’s beliefs by citing historical documents, and then from the perspective of a
community with a shared future for humankind, to manifest the success of the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and the United States by presenting facts and data. Wang
cited,
China and the US now account for over one-third of global economic output and over
50% of global growth. Bilateral trade volume has increased by over 250 times since the
early days of diplomatic ties and takes up one-fifth of the global total. Two-way
investment has jumped from almost zero to nearly US$240 billion, and annual two-way
visits by the two peoples have reached five million... Statistics show that China-US
business ties support 2.6 million American jobs. Trade with China helps each American
family save US$850 every year. Over 70,000 American businesses have made
investments in China with a total sales volume of US$700 billion. Among them, 97% are
making a profit. Even with the trade friction and COVID-19, the vast majority of
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American companies in China still want to stay and are doubling down on investment in
China (1-2).
By presenting detailed data rather than giving a simple conclusion, Wang increased the
credibility of his conclusions. Similarly, Yang also demonstrated the fruitful achievements of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States by citing detailed
data. It was different from Wang's argument that the engagement between China and the United
States has enabled both sides to achieve a win-win situation in economic development by citing
data, the examples cited by Yang better reflect the friendship between the Chinese and American
people
The exchange of visits between the Chinese and American people jumped from several
thousand to over five million per year. More than 400,000 Chinese students are studying
in the US. Fifty pairs of sister provinces/states and 227 pairs of sister cities have been
forged between the two sides. In the face of natural disasters from Hurricane Katrina in
2005 to the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, our two peoples felt for each other and lent
each other a helping hand. When COVID-19 struck, Chinese and Americans from all
walks of life rushed to each other's assistance. Chinese provinces, cities, enterprises and
institutions have donated masks, protective gowns and other medical supplies to affected
populations, communities, cities and states in the US. They have also provided the US
with large quantities of virus containment materials (2020, p5).
Under the guidance of the framework of a community with a shared future for
humankind, Yang's speech was more inclined to emphasize friendly exchanges between
people/citizens, rather than being limited to exchanges between states. From the perspective of
describing the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, Yang refuted Pompeo's
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claim that the United States was unilaterally hurt in the China-American engagement. And it also
laid the groundwork for another strategy, separating the current administration of the United
States from the American people.
After refuting Pompeo's re-narrative of Nixon's remarks, the Chinese government also
gave an interpretation of "inducing changes". Wang responded that while globalization and free
trade create development dividends, they would also bring contradictions and problems to their
respective economic structures and distribution of interests. This needed to be adjusted through
internal reform, rather than “acting like a sick person who forces others to take medicine for his
own illness” (2020, p2). Wang indicated the subjects and objects that need to be changed here,
that is, each country should seek its own reforms in line with the new status quo and needs on the
road of development, rather than trying to change others.
Le's interpretation of "inducing changes" was more direct and provocative. He pointed
out more directly that China-US diplomacy was never based on change, and no one ever thought
China-US diplomacy failed. Now, without the Chinese government changing, the Trump
administration unilaterally believed that China-US diplomacy has failed, which proves that the
US government has its own problems. Le said, “I find it difficult to understand why those US
politicians get so hostile to the CPC. ...it was with CPC leaders that President Richard Nixon had
the handshake across the Pacific Ocean. It was with CPC leaders that the United States agreed on
the three China-US joint communiqués. White House and State Department officials are dealing
with CPC members almost every day. How could the CPC suddenly become a threat and
challenge to the United States? Since the CPC remains unchanged, the problem is with the US
politicians” (2020). The focus of Le's statement was on proving the continuity of the Chinese
Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party has never changed, and the previous US
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administration has never tried to change the Chinese Communist Party. So the failure of the
China-US engagement proposed by the Trump administration was not the problem of the
Chinese Communist Party, but the Trump administration itself.
While the dispute over Nixon's intentions towards China was not directly related to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the nature of the dispute between Secretary Pompeo and Chinese
diplomats represents an important aspect of China's overall rhetorical strategy during this period.
In an effort to refocus Chinese-U.S. relations on cooperation and shared interests, the Chinese
government attempted to offer an alternate interpretation of Nixon's past rhetoric by arguing that
the history of U.S.-Chinese relations has been one of recognizing their shared humanity and
interests in peace, stability, and economic progress.
2) Differentiating Between the Government and the People Strategy
One of the notable dynamics within the dispute between Pompeo and Chinese officials
over their diplomatic history, was Pompeo's insistence on differentiating the Chinese government
from the Chinese people. He consistently used "Communist China" and "CCP" throughout his
speech instead of using "China" directly, and clearly pointed out that "we must also engage and
empower the Chinese people – a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct
from the Chinese Communist Party” (Pompeo, 2020). Pompeo's rhetoric of differentiation
provided a basis for dealing punitively with the Chinese government while continuing to espouse
support for the Chinese people. This strategy of differentiating the government from the people it
represents was also mirrored by Chinese diplomats during this period as the Chinese government
sought to craft a rhetorical distinction between the U.S. and the Trump administration.
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Chinese statements during this period consistently targeted the Trump administration.
Just as Pompeo has always used "Communist China", the Chinese side's speech has always been,
"the current administration of the United States" and "a few politicians in the US". Wang Yi said
that the root cause of the grim situation between China and the United States was that “some
American politicians who are biased against and hostile to China are using their power to smear
China with fabrications and impede normal ties with China under various pretexts” (2020). What
Wang meant was that there was no problem with the China-US relationship itself rather the
problem was the efforts to politicize this relationship. These politicians, Wang argued, were
trying "to revive McCarthyism in an attempt to undermine US relations with China, stoke
hostility between the two peoples, and erode trust between the two countries. Ultimately, they
want to drag China and the US into renewed conflict and confrontation and plunge the world into
chaos and division again” (Wang, 2020). These American politicians were dragging “China and
the US” into the conflict. In Wang's context, China and the U.S. were on a united front, while the
U.S. politicians were the initiators of attempts to revive McCarthyism, regain the Cold War, and
push the world toward unpeace. And at the same time, the role played by the Chinese
government, according to Yang (2020), was “to firmly defend China’s sovereignty, security and
development interests and firmly safeguard and stabilize China-US relations”. Then, Yang
added, "a sound and stable China-US relationship affects the well-being of China, the US, and
the world at large, both now and in the future. It is what the people of both countries and the
wider world. expect to see. We must never allow a handful of self-serving US politicians to push
the relationship into serious jeopardy.” Yang believed that the Chinese government was actually
representing the people of China and the United States, and even the people of the whole world,

Ran 69
for peace, and was fighting against the selfish politicians of the United States, who were
dragging the world into the whirlpool of a Cold War.
While these statements were general to the overall condition of U.S.-Chinese relations,
they also constituted an effort to return to the frame of Shared Humanity. The efforts by the
Trump administration and associated U.S. political leaders were creating a dangerous dynamic of
politicization that was not only undermining global responses to the COVID-19 pandemic but
was also endangering the world as a whole.
Pursuing this condemnation of the Trump administration's efforts to politicize ChineseU.S. relations by attacking the Chinese government, the Chinese government consistently
rejected the Trump administration, characterizing it as selfish and biased. Instead, Chinese
diplomats crafted messages that rejected the U.S. administration while embracing the American
people. In the Chinese rhetorical construction, the American people were as peace-loving as
Chinese people and all supported Chinese-American friendship. In this construction, the Chinese
government and the American people stand together, while the current U.S. government was
their enemy.
Employing the strategy of mirroring the U.S. rhetoric of differentiation and vilification,
the Chinese government has continued to deepen its portrayal of the current U.S. government as
self-serving and prejudiced image as a response to the Trump administration's portrayal of the
Chinese government as a brutal dictator. In this part of the argument, the comparative analysis of
China and the United States was widely used. Wang Yi (2020) said that the current
administration of the United States was impulsive, anxious, and lack of confidence; Yang (2020)
said that the actions of American politicians were self-serving; Le (2020) pointed out that the
biggest characteristic of American politicians was "they lie readily, (and) they break the law
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habitually." In contrast, China “is a major and responsible country … (and) ready to enter into
candid, effective consultation with the US side and make a cool-headed and sensible response to
the impulsive moves and anxiety of the US side” (Wang, 2020); is “responsible to history and to
people” (Yang, 2020); is “honest and law-abiding” (Le, 2020).
Specifically, Wang pointed out that the United States, as the country with the greatest
comprehensive strength, abandoned international responsibilities and multilateral rules, and even
at the worst moment of the pandemic, unreasonably attacked and withdrew from the World
Health Organization. Moreover, the number of international treaties that the current US
administration has withdrawn has exceeded that of any previous US administration, making it the
biggest destroyer of the current international order. On the contrary, China has always been a
staunch defender of the international order and system. Wang (2020) stated, “China is always a
firm defender of the international order and the international system. In the past seven decades
and more since the founding of the People's Republic, China never started a war or occupied an
inch of the land of others. We have enshrined in the Constitution our commitment to peaceful
development, and we are the first country in the world to make such a solemn pledge". The same
case was used by Le (2020) to argue that American politicians break the law, "the United States
is always selective about the application of international law. It preaches international law to
others but sticks to 'American Exceptionalism', putting itself above the international law". And,
"none of its actions conforms with international law - increasing tariffs, cutting off supplies to
Huawei, banning TikTok, detaining Chinese citizens, selling arms to Taiwan, imposing sanctions
on Chinese central government and Hong Kong SAR government officials, and closing Chinese
Consulate-General in Houston” (Le, 2020).
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The accusation that the U.S. government was a bad actor in international relations
became a key aspect in the shift of China's apologetic rhetorical strategy of shared humanity with
a strategy that was more directly accusatory towards the U.S. government. In their on-going
vilification of the Trump administration, Le (2020) listed several cases of dishonesty by the U.S.
government:
they claim that the United States rebuilt China; China wants to rule the United States; the
United States is ripped off by doing business with China; COVID-19 was created in the
Wuhan Institute of Virology; China steals US intellectual property on COVID-19
vaccines; Huawei, TikTok and other companies directly provide personal data to China's
national security authorities; the 1.4 billion Chinese people are under surveillance and
persecution in China; the Chinese government is carrying out religious persecution and
ethnic genocide in Xinjiang (p1).
This expansive list of accusations of dishonesty from Trump administration officials provides a
good example of the overall shift in Chinese rhetoric during the summer of 2020. While
continuing to insist upon a Shared Humanity with the American people, the Chinese government
contended that the Trump administration represented the real enemy. Mirroring U.S. accusations
against China's honesty, Le provides a litany of topics on which the Trump administration is
accused of dishonesty, including COVID-19. In the Chinese construction, Chinese-U.S. relations
have historically been built on a frame of shared humanity and, as articulated during the first
months of the pandemic, this frame should be maintained in the face of COVID-19. The real
global crisis was not COVID-19 or the Chinese government, it was the Trump administration's
deceitful and divisive approach to global issues.
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Conclusion
In general, the Chinese government's response to the US accusations in the early stage of
the fight against the pandemic was guided by the framework of a community with a shared future
for humankind that the Chinese government was trying to promote to the world. The core
purpose was to situate China as part of the world family by building an image of a common
home for humankind, thereby alleviating the accusation. In the first stage, the Chinese
government tried to respond to the accusations in a more rational way by promoting purely
scientific language and opposing the politicization of the virus by Western governments.
Due to the rapidly changing international situation, the Chinese government has to make
changes in its apologetic strategy for the pandemic. Also within the framework of a community
with a shared future for humankind, the Chinese government responded to the accusations by
mirroring the US government's accusations against China. By listing a lot of sensational
allegations from the West, and emphasizing that the West's allegations were never supported by
any evidence, Le reinforced the sense that Western politicians were fabricating lies, thereby
weakening the credibility of the accusations. As a result, the image of American politicians as
insane, irresponsible, and biased was reinforced. Combine with what I just mentioned above, the
US politicians do not abide by the law and selectively apply international law, the current U.S.
government was vividly portrayed as irrational, irresponsible, and immature. Therefore, the
current U.S. government was not only the enemy of peace in the world, more importantly, it was
also an irrational lunatic, a selfish villain, and a criminal of the law. Such a depiction also lays
the groundwork for the change of frame and strategy of the Chinese governmental response
towards COVID-19 in the next stage, that is, after Biden won the US election.
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Chapter Three:
From Reset to Decolonization: The Chinese Government's COVID-19 Response in
the Biden Administration
During the first phases of the COVID pandemic, China responded to Western accusations
through a rhetorical framework insisting upon a Shared Humanity. As detailed in the preceding
chapter, China initially urged global governments to see the virus as a medical issue and a
natural threat to everyone. As the changing geopolitical context and the Trump administration
continued to push accusations against the Chinese government, Chinese officials responded by
mirroring the U.S. accusatory rhetoric while still pushing for a shared response to the pandemic.
Throughout this period, Chinese government changed from a passive role in responding to
accusations to actively expressing its demands, actively responding to the pandemic by accusing
Western governments.
In this chapter, I examine the increasingly aggressive response from the Chinese
government during the period lasting from November of 2020 until September of 2021. I divide
this chapter into three stages with major events serving as punctuation points. The first stage is
from November 2020, when Biden defeated Trump to win the US presidential election, to April
2021, at the time the US Senate proposed the Strategic Competition Act of 2021. At this stage,
the Chinese government directly bypassed the Trump administration, started a dialogue with the
Biden administration, and actively expressed its expectations for Chinese-US cooperation. I
argue that the Chinese government generally adopts a reset frame at this stage, mainly to rebuild
Chinese-US relations by denying the Trump administration and expressing the hope to go back
to the pre-Trump administration's Chinese-US relations. The second stage is from April to June
2021, from the proposal to the formal adoption of the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 by the
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U.S. Senate. During this stage, the Chinese government mainly used the silence frame. The
Strategic Competition Act of 2021 was to emphasize the China threat theory and define the
competitive relationship with China, which was very anti-China. The Chinese government
remained completely silent and given up on having any exchange with the US until the proposal
was passed. The third stage is that from July to September, until China's top leader, President Xi,
and the United States' top leader, President Biden, agreed to stop accusing each other and restart
dialogue. At this stage, the Chinese government began to actively use the logic of Chinese values
to convey the Chinese connotations while accusing the United States of hegemony, which is the
maturity of what I identify as postcolonial apologia. In the following, I will first define the
overall frame of the Chinese government's response to the West in each stage, and then analyze
how these frames are implemented in combination with textual evidence. In other words, what
strategies are used by the Chinese government in different frames. The first stage is the reset
frame.
Reset Frame
As noted in the previous chapter, many of the more direct attacks against the United
States during the Fall of 2020 were aimed at the Trump administration. Indeed, the Chinese
government was seen to have mirrored the U.S. tactic of differentiating the Chinese government
from the Chinese people by focusing on the Trump administration as an aberration in ChineseU.S. relations. The election of Joseph Biden to the presidency, therefore, represented an
important initial punctuation point. The Chinese government started to reframe the entire
discourse as soon as Biden won in November 2020, even if Biden would officially take office in
January 2021. During this stage, the Chinese government used the reset frame mainly to try to
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persuade the Biden administration to reassess the Chinese-US relationship and bring it back to
the state before the Trump administration.
The reset frame shows the continuity of the Differentiating Between the Government and
the People Strategy used by the Chinese government during the Trump administration as
mentioned in the previous chapter. Because the Chinese government separated the Trump
administration from the American people at that time, they portrayed the Trump administration
as an enemy that undermined Chinese-US relations. So, after Biden won the presidential
election, the Chinese government immediately gave up engaging with the Trump administration
and instead began to communicate directly with the Biden administration. Even before Biden
officially represented the U.S. government, the Chinese government chose to proactively express
its expectations for the Biden administration’s Chinese-U.S. relations. This also shows that the
Chinese government took the initiative to change the relationship from one of accusation and
defense towards one of positive engagement. At this stage I have identified three strategies
mainly used by the Chinese government, 1) Erasing Trump Strategy, 2) The Re/Back to Strategy,
3) The Go-forward Strategy. Before analyzing the reset frame through these three strategies I
would also like to introduce and justify my textual evidence.
In this first stage, I collected eight articles in direct dialogue with the United States posted
in the "Fighting COVID-19: China's Experiences in response to COVID-19" section. They are all
from the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And the "Fighting COVID19: China's Experiences in response to COVID-19" section collects all Chinese government
responses to COVID-19. The responses were sent by China's top leader, President Xi, and
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, texts posed in this section mean that
the Chinese government acknowledges that these statements/speech/transcripts represent their
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official position. They are: “Wang Yi Holds a Videoconference with a Delegation of Board of
the US-China Business Council” on December 7th, 2020; "Anything is Possible When China and
the United States Choose to Cooperate - Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng at
Vision China" January 28th, 2021; "Xi speaks with Biden on phone" on February 11th; "Yang
Jiechi and Wang Yi Hold China-U.S. High-level Strategic Dialogue with Antony Blinken and
Jake Sullivan" on March 20th; "Transcript of Vice Minister Le Yucheng's Exclusive Interview
with the Associated Press of the United States" on April 18th; "Chinese VP calls for promoting
sound development of China-U.S. ties" on April 24th, 2021; "Focusing on Cooperation and
Managing Differences: Bringing China-U.S. Relations Back to the Track of Sound and Steady
Development" by Wang Yi on April 24, 2021; "Drawing on History and Looking to the Future to
Advance China-U.S. Relations along the Right Track - In Commemoration of the 50th
Anniversary of China-U.S. Ping-Pong Diplomacy" by Yang Jiechi on April 29th, 2021. These
articles all expressed the Chinese government's ardent expectations of the new US administration
for Chinese-US cooperation. In addition, the Chinese government concentrated on publishing 4
articles in April, in response to the 50th anniversary of ping pong diplomacy and the Strategic
Competition Act of 2021 proposed by the US Senate, actively calling for Chinese-US
cooperation. Then I will use these posts to do a rhetorical analysis in an attempt to shed light on
how the Chinese government’s response to COVID-19 attempted to persuade the Biden
administration to reshape Chinese-US relations. I have identified three strategies used by the
Chinese government in the discourse of this frame to achieve this goal, 1) Erasing Trump
Strategy, 2) The Re/Back to Strategy, 3) The Go-forward Strategy.
1) Erasing Trump Strategy
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The most apparent strategy used by the Chinese government in the reset frame to get
Chinse-US relations back on track is the erasing Trump strategy. As I mentioned above, this
strategy is a continuity of the Differentiating Between the Government and the People Strategy.
Because the distinction between the Trump administration and the American people served the
purpose of erasing the meaning of Trump's administration's contribution to the Chines-US
relations. Specifically, the Chinese government defined Chinese-US relations as right and normal
exchanges before the Trump administration. Therefore, the Biden administration's attitude
towards Chinese-US relations should remove the undermining of Chinese-US cooperation during
the Trump governance.
The Chinese government rejected the Trump presidency on a large scale, from its attitude
towards Chinese-US relations to pandemic prevention and control work. They defined the Trump
administration as the root cause of the troubled Chinese-U.S. relationship. Wang Yi (2020) said,
"the serious difficulties encountered in China-US relations in recent years are something we do
not want to see", and he believes "the fundamental cause of the most severe situation in ChinaUS relations since the establishment of bilateral relations lies in the fact that some people on the
US side cling to the old-dated Cold War mentality and the ideological prejudice" (1-2). Le
Yucheng (2020) pointed out more directly that many "traps of mistrust, pitfalls of division, and
poison of hatred" in the "last four years' journey of our relationship" are the source of the
deterioration of Chinese-US relations (2). By "the last four years," Le was directly targeting the
Trump administration. And Le compared the Chinese-US relations during the Trump
administration to traps, pitfalls, and poison. Compared with the previous attacks on the Trump
administration, the Chinese government's denial of Trump's administration was even harsh when
it learned that Biden had won.
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The Chinese government consistently used particular modifiers to refer to the Trump
administration, such as "some people on the US side" used by Wang Yi. In addition, Wang Yi
also used "the previous government" to refer to the Trump administration. “The United States, in
shaping its China policy, has not stepped out of the shadow of the previous administration” and
“The previous US administration willfully walked away from international organizations,
commitments and responsibilities, seriously disrupting the existing international system” (1-3).
Yang Jiechi (2021) used “some in the United States” in his speech. “Some in the United States,
out of the Cold-War zero-sum mentality, have caused disruption and created obstacles to normal
people-to-people exchanges” (3). From the choice of modifier, the Chinese government defined
the scope of its attack; that was, the object to be denied was only the Trump government, not the
US government. This also revealed that the object of the Chinese government's dialogue during
this stage was the Biden administration.
Le explicitly denied the Trump administration's failure to contain the COVID-19
spreading and made it clearer that the failure was because Trump gamed politics rather than
fighting the pandemic scientifically. “I cannot stop thinking about what could have been done
differently. Had the Trump administration chosen science and cooperation over scapegoating and
political games, how many lives could have been saved” (1)? Le then went on to link Trump's
failure in COVID-19 to the failure of the Chines-US exchange, "the Trump administration's
misguided China policy in the past four years has proven an utter failure in meeting the common
challenge like COVID-19" (1).
The Chinese government's purpose in denying and attacking Trump's administration was
to ultimately erase his governance and return to the Obama era. In the interview, Le compared
the Obama era and the Trump era's policies and then directly talked to Biden to express
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expectations for returning to the United States. “During the Obama administration, three joint
statements and one cooperation document on climate change were issued. And we jointly played
an important part for the Paris Agreement to be reached. Under the Trump administration, the
US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, which caused serious disruptions to international
climate efforts. Now that President Biden has announced the US return, we welcome that”
("Transcript of Vice Minister Le Yucheng's Exclusive Interview with the Associated Press of the
United States," 2). By affirming the policies of the Obama era and denying the policies of the
Trump era, the Chinese government issued an invitation to the Biden administration to erase
Trump administration, that was, go back to the previous period. Therefore, the re-/back to
strategy is the second strategy I identified that the Chinese government mainly used to
implement the reset frame.
2) Re/back to Strategy
The Chinese government was also actively persuading the Biden administration to lead
the United States back to the previous norms while using the strategy of erasing the Trump
administration. The Chinese government applied a lot of "back" and "re-" discourse, expressing
that the Biden administration should fix the mistakes of the Trump era before it can truly get
America back. Interestingly, this strategy also resonated with Biden's election campaign. When
Biden used the "America Is Back" and "BUILD BACK BETTER" strategies to win the election,
the Chinese government also used "recovery", "back", and "return" discourses expecting Biden
to lead the United States back to a cooperative China-US relation.
The Chinese government repeatedly quoted Biden’s campaign remarks. On the one hand,
it expressed its approval of Biden’s ruling ideas, and on the other hand, it used Biden’s words to
achieve its expectation that China-US relations would return to normal. "You have said that
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America can be defined in one word: Possibilities. We hope the possibilities will now point
toward an improvement of China-U.S. relations," President Xi said in a call with Biden.
President Xi articulates a clear expectation that the United States under Biden's leadership will
open new possibilities of cooperation with China. Similarly, Le (2021) expressed a positive
attitude towards the Biden administration in the interview. "I read his inauguration speech with
great interest, and was especially impressed by his repeated appeal to the American people for
unity over division. I believe we need exactly the same spirit for China-U.S. relations… Now
that President Biden has announced the U.S. return, we welcome that. Since the United States
has come back, it shall stay and redouble its efforts to make up for the time lost during its
absence." (1-2). The Chinese government extended Biden's domestic commitment to the
American people during his campaign and inauguration to its outlook for Chinese-US relations.
When Biden emphasized the solidarity of the people within the United States to resist
division, Le extended its connotation to the United States and China united to resist division. At
the same time, although Biden's "back" meant economic recovery plan for working families, the
Chinese government expanded the meaning of "back" to Chinse-US cooperation ("The Build
Back Better Framework | The White House", 2021). By mirroring Biden's campaign rhetoric,
Chinese officials sought to create a shared rhetorical framework in which all parties would be
obligated to return to previous positive relations. By citing and extending Biden's remarks, the
Chinese government was also trying to show Biden that China and the United States can stand in
the same camp, thus redirecting the rhetorical frame to one of cooperation and "shared
humanity."
In addition, the Chinese government also emphasized that the return of Chinese-US
relations to the "right track" required the Biden administration to first clarify its attitude, that
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was, to repair the problems left by the previous administration. Le raised the urgency of repair,
"a lot of repair has to be done. I agree with American friends' suggestion that both sides take
small steps first to create conditions for improving the relationship. But we have to act now to
bring China- US relations back on track” (1-2). Wang Yi mentioned that the return of ChineseUS relations to normal demanded the return of the US's China policy to rationality and
objectivity. “China and the US should work in a direction that serves the common interests of the
two countries and peoples, so that the two can resume dialogue, bring relations back on track and
rebuild mutual trust for the next stage of bilateral relations… we expect the US policy toward
China to return to objectivity and rationality and also believe this will happen sooner or later”
(Wang, 1-2). In the call with President Biden, President Xi specifically pointed out the direction
for the return of Chinese-US relations. “The two sides should re-establish the various dialogue
mechanisms, read each other's policy intentions accurately, and avoid misunderstanding and
miscalculation,” he said, adding that "it is important to manage differences where they exist and
jointly pursue cooperation where it is desirable to do so" ("Xi speaks with Biden on phone",
2021). Even if China's attitude towards the Biden administration was positive, the Chinese
government still maintained a cautious and tentative perspective in terms of specific policies.
Le believed the two sides should take a small first step. Wang was more cautious in
expressing that China was waiting for the U.S. to return to rationality and objectivity toward
China. This meant that before the Biden administration took the lead in contributing to the repair
of Chinse-US relations, the Chinese government did not intend to be the first to liberalize in
policy. President Xi was also careful that the current restoration of Chinse-US relations should
begin with restarting the dialogue. In other words, the Chinese government, while sending a
positive signal to the Biden administration, did not plan to take the lead in making concrete
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practices to show goodwill to the Biden administration. In a way, China was taking the Biden
administration at its own words: if the administration was planning to "build back better," then it
would be Biden's responsibility to start the rebuilding. While putting the responsibility firmly on
the Biden administration, Chinese diplomats were explicit in laying out their expectations of
what this "building back" would look like as Chinese-U.S. relations moved forward. I turn to the
articulation of these expectations in the next section.
3) The Go-forward Strategy
When the Chinese government tried to erase the Trump administration and persuaded the
Biden administration to lead the United States back to normal Chinese-US relations, the Chinese
government also actively explained what they believed to be normal Chinese-US relations. The
Chinese government communicated positive expectations to the Biden administration for
Chinese-US cooperation and clarified steps to normalize Chinese-US relations. By reviewing and
emphasizing the past of China-US exchange since Ping-Pong diplomacy, and by depicting the
future that China-US cooperation in fighting the pandemic can bring, the Chinese government
was forecasting their expectations to the Biden administration for the future of Chinese-US
cooperation.
The normal relationship that the Chinese government referred to was very
straightforward. From President Xi to all the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
China, without exception, they pointed out directly that it is cooperation. The Chinese
government framed it very absolutely, that was, cooperation was the only right track. Xi (2021)
stressed that “China and the United States both gain from cooperation and lose from
confrontation; cooperation is the only right choice for both sides…. When China and the United
States work together, they can accomplish a great deal for the good of both countries and the
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world at large" (1). Wang Qishan emphasized that "Cooperation is the only right choice" (1-2).
Wang Yi stated that "we maintain that the right approach to China-US relations is to step up
dialogue, deepen cooperation, narrow differences and avoid confrontation" (2). At the same time,
the Chinese government also emphasized the serious consequences of the conflict. Xi (2021)
stated that “confrontation between the two countries, however, will definitely be disastrous for
both countries and the world.... (and) that the China-U.S. relationship is currently at an important
juncture” (1). Le believed that China and the United States need to avoid confrontation, and "in
particular, avoid creating confrontation" (1). Describing cooperation as the only, absolute right
track showed the Chinese government's strong desire for a cooperative relationship between
China and the United States. At the same time, in order to achieve this goal, the harmfulness of
confrontation also been emphasized. Not only that, the consequences of the Chinese-US
confrontation that the Chinese government highlighted were catastrophic, and a disaster for not
only people in these two countries but the whole world. Further, the Chinese government also
clarified the meaning of cooperation
Cooperation shall always be equal-footed and lead to win-win outcomes. It is not one
side drawing up a laundry list of demands to the other side. In English, you have the
prefix of "co-", which means doing things together. In cooperation, one should not be
selfish and care only about self-interests with little regard for the well-being of the other
side... and We have noticed that President Biden's statement that the United States has
returned to multilateralism. And we hope true multilateralism will be upheld. True
multilateralism means mutual acceptance and seeking common ground, rather than group
politics and teaming up against others. It calls for cooperation, not confrontation and
division (Le, 1).

Ran 84
Emphasizing the definition of cooperation also reflected the proactive but cautious attitude of the
Chinese government. Through the usage of the "co-" prefix in English, Le proposed that the
Chinese government's definition of Chinese-US cooperation was based on mutual benefit and
win-win, and equal treatment.
The Chinese government also expressed its positive expectations for Biden by citing
Biden's biography. They asserted that Biden knew China well and had a friendly attitude towards
China because, "President Joe Biden has visited China a total of four times, and has a better
knowledge of China. He first visited China as a young Senator in 1979 and met with Mr. Deng
Xiaoping. It was the same year the two countries normalized bilateral relations” (Le, 1). The
Chinese government portrayed Biden as having "a better knowledge of China" as a way for
differentiating him from his predecessor. The observation of Biden's trips to China also noted the
way the new U.S. president witnessed normal Chinese-US relations. The Chinese government
was trying to shape Biden into a figure for the normalization of Chinese-US relations, and let
him carry some significance of Chinese-US cooperation. In contrast to the Chinese government's
portrayal of Trump as the root of the deterioration of Chinese-US relations, the Chinese
government's shaping of Biden's significance in Chinese-US relations was to a certain extent
pressure on Biden, because he was carrying the friendly relationship between China and the
United States.
The Chinese government also listed areas of future Chinese-US cooperation. Wang
(2021) proposed the focus of the current cooperation. "Facing such major global challenges as
the wide-spreading pandemic and economic recession, China and the US should work together to
show our responsibilities and commitments. It's quite possible for both countries to find entry
points of cooperation on fighting against the pandemic, promoting economic recovery and
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combating climate change. The most pressing task now is to contain the pandemic together. It’s
necessary for us to cooperate in treatment experience sharing, anti-pandemic supplies
manufacturing, and vaccine and drug development” (2). Le (2021) added more possibility of
cooperation. “We will also enhance macroeconomic policy coordination with the United States
to help global economic recovery. On climate change, an issue essential to the future of
humanity, China is ready to renew cooperation with the United States. Our closer resultsoriented cooperation on clean energy, low-carbon technologies, and environmental protection
will go a long way toward Mother Earth” (2). Yang Jiechi, on the other hand, emphasized
cooperation in the economic field and tried to attract friendly attitudes from the United States by
describing the unlimited prospects of the Chinese market. “As a big developing country with 1.4
billion people, China has tremendous market potentials... All this will create greater development
space for companies from around the world, including those from the United States. We are
happy to see American companies succeed in China. We hope they will join us in keeping
industrial and supply chains safe and stable for the benefit of both sides” (2). After the Chinese
government expressed its desire for cooperation and clarified their definition of cooperation, they
began to paint a bright future for Chinese-US cooperation. Chinese diplomats laid out a clear set
of steps for improving Chinese-US relations and re-engaging with their concern for shared
humanity and interests.
In general, the Chinese government started using reset frames after Biden won the
presidential election. They actively initiated dialogue with Biden, trying to persuade Biden to
change his China policy by erasing the Trump administration, so that Chinese-US relations could
return to a normal track. The Chinese government also proposed their definition of cooperation
and painted a bright vision for Chinese-US cooperation. But it is worth noting that although the
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Chinese government actively conveyed its intention to cooperate with the Biden administration,
they cautiously waited for Biden to take the lead in taking action, rather than actively making
policy adjustments to show goodwill to Biden. The cautious attitude of the Chinese government
led to a strategic silence during the next stage, when the U.S. Senate proposed the Strategic
Competition Act of 2021 to the stage of formal adoption. This is the second stage I will analyze
next, from April to June 2021, which is a frame of strategic silence.
Political Strategic Silence Frame
In the months following Biden's inauguration, China tried to employ the "Build Back
Better" rhetoric of the Biden campaign to urge a reframing of Chinese-US relations. Having
framed the future of Chinese-US relations as the responsibility of Biden, the Chinese government
chose a strategy of silence while the U.S. government formulated its new foreign policies. This
period saw the U.S. choose to continue the antagonistic strategy of the Trump administration,
solidified in the Strategic Competition Act of 2021.
The Biden administration sent the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 to the U.S. Senate
for consideration on April 21, 2021. After a month and a half, the bill was passed by the U.S.
Senate on June 8 with 68 votes in favor and 32 against (Zengerle and Martina, 2021). During the
stage between the submission of the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 and its formal adoption,
the Chinese government did not publish any posts directly responding to the United States in the
"Fighting COVID-19: China's Experiences in response to COVID- 19" section and chose a
silence frame. The bill was defined as a significant bill jointly formulating a bipartisan strategic
policy toward China, aiming to counter China in every dimension, including politics, economy,
technology, culture, military, etc. The Strategic Competition Act of 2021, more than 2,000 pages
long, integrated many previous U.S. bills with the Endless Frontiers Act as its base and covered
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almost all China-related affairs. The Act clarified the diplomatic policy towards China would
base on competition and confrontation, specifically including technology competition,
international alliance and foreign affairs, aerospace, chips and 5G wireless, manufacturing, cyber
security and artificial intelligence, drones, medicine research, Hong Kong and Xinjiang affairs
and many other issues ("United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021", 2021). Reuters
described it as embodying “U.S. lawmakers intensify bipartisan efforts to counter China”
(Zengerle and Martina, 2021). Under such a situation, the Chinese government remained silent at
this stage.
Silence is ubiquitous in interpersonal communication but less common in international
relations. Therefore, the rhetorical implications of silence in political strategy are worth studying.
Barry Brummett (1980) defines political strategic silence as a kind of non-verbal communication
in “Towards a theory of silence as a political strategy” and “failure to speak itself, under certain
conditions, will have rhetorical influence” (289). In his definition, “silence becomes strategic
only when talk is expected. Silence is strategic when someone has pressing reason to speak, but
does not” (289). Furthermore, Brummett clearly distinguished between the meaning of silence in
interpersonal communication and that in political strategy. While silence in interpersonal
communication contains various meanings that are difficult to identify due to the uncertainty of
context, the meaning of silence in political strategy is almost absolute: mystery, uncertainty,
passivity, and relinquishment (290). He argued, "denial of talk, as in strategic political silence,
almost always means mystery, uncertainty, passivity, and relinquishment" (290). Brummett
explains, "through verbal discourse we coordinate and mediate our activities, define who we are
and get a fix on the characters of others, and make significant symbols, forms, and rituals that
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grease the social wheels and define roles and responsibilities... then strategical silence is taken to
mean the temporary denial of relationship" (291-292).
In this case, the Chinese government used a silence strategically. The Chinese
government was expected to speak as the target of the Strategic Competition Act of 2021, but
they unexpectedly chose to remain silent. After the Chinese government took the initiative to
release a signal of cooperation to the Biden administration in the last stage, Biden did not change
the US attitude towards China during the Trump era after he officially took office and tried to
define a more rigid policy toward China, which disappointed the Chinese government. Hence the
political strategic silence of the Chinese government at this stage, as Brummett mentioned,
implied mystery, uncertainty, passivity, and relinquishment. By refusing to engage in rhetorical
responses, China emphasized the uncertainty of future relations with the U.S. and that the future
of this relation was in the hands of the Biden administration.
The silence of the Chinese government at this stage was the transition to the next stage
when the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 was officially passed. In the next stage, when the
Chinese government realized that the Biden administration did not define Chinese-US relations
as cooperative as expected but instead adopted a competitive relationship, it turned to an utterly
anti-Western frame, which I call the postcolonial apologetic frame.
Postcolonial Apologetic Frame
Looking back at the Chinese government's previous response to Western accusations
during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is not difficult to find that even though the Chinese
government has been resisting the western, it has always had positive expectations for the US
government. During the Trump era, the Chinese government's apologetic discourse focused on
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accusing the Trump administration and portraying him as the culprit for undermining ChinsesUS relations rather than the US government. The Chinese government's response to the United
States at Trump's stage sought to embrace the United States by distinguishing between the
Trump administration and the American people. When Biden won the election, the Chinese
government immediately gave up the exchange with the Trump administration and instead put
the expectation of cooperation on the Biden administration. However, the apologetic discourse of
the Chinese government had to change completely when the Biden administration rejected the
Chinese government's invitation and adopted competition and confrontation to define relations
with China. What the Chinese government needed to confront this time was not the Biden
administration itself, but the entire US government, because both the Trump administration and
the Biden administration have taken a tough stance on China. Therefore, the Chinese government
had to reframe the entirety of their relationship with the U.S. and the West and adopt a
completely different apologetic stance than before, which I define as a postcolonial apologia.
Postcolonial apologia is questioning and resistant to the colonial legacy of the West, and
its primary purpose is to oppose imperial cultural hegemony and Western centrism. Gramsci
defines cultural hegemony as the predominance of a particular point of view in society (7).
People practice some cultural take-for-grant. Following Gramsci's idea, Said (1979) analyzes
how cultural hegemony was achieved through the process of Western colonization. And under
this cultural hegemony, Western culture become an authority, and rules have been formulated to
judge non-Western cultures as inferior, primitive, and inhuman, and something should be
discarded. Therefore, the West is the judge of the world and sets society's rules. As emphasized
by Raka Shome (1996), a postcolonial perspective calls for rethinking the hegemonic legitimacy
of Western power structures. Postcolonial apologia, I argue, refers to the self-defense rhetoric of
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the non-Western against the West accusations by questioning imperial cultural hegemony and
Westerncentralism. Specifically, the non-Western resist the colonial legacy of the Westerndominated world order.
Postcolonial apologia is transcendent. The object of the accused's response is no longer
the specific accuser but the system as a whole. In terms of this particular Chinese government's
accusations against the West during the COVID-19 pandemic, the post-colonial apologia adopted
by the Chinese government is to question the existing West-centered world order under the
colonial legacy. It is a challenge and decolonization to Western dominant public health
discourse, geopolitical power relations, and even Western ideologies. In other words, the Chinese
government was still playing the game that the Western set the rules in the previous stage.
However, under the current frame, the Chinese government began to question the rules
themselves and try to add a Chinese interpretation to these existing regulations.
In the postcolonial apologetic frame, the Chinese government appeared to be responding
to the US government's accusations, but in fact it sought the support of a global audience,
especially third world countries oppressed by colonialism. Under this frame, the Chinese
government changed its previous position of not commenting on the domestic affairs of other
countries, and directly pointed out the disastrous consequences of American hegemony and its
colonialism. In addition to this, the Chinese government also provided a Chinese solution to the
decolonization process around the world by adding an interpretation of traditional Chinese values
to Western ideology.
I collected five articles published in the "Fighting COVID-19: China's Experiences in
response to COVID-19" section during this stage, they are: "Transcript of Vice Foreign Minister
Le Yucheng's Exclusive Interview with Guancha.cn" published on July, 9th, 2021; "Xie Feng:
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How can the United States portray itself as the world's spokesperson for democracy and human
rights?" on July, 26th, 2021; "Statement by Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on Release of US
Intelligence Report on COVID-19 Origins" on August 28th, 2021, and "Yang Jiechi tells U.S.
climate envoy Kerry to bring China-U.S. ties back on right track" on 29th. By analyzing the
Chinese government's articles posted on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website that they agree
can represent China's official position, I think it allows us to study how the Chinese government
implements a postcolonial apologia frame. I identified two strategies used in this stage by the
Chinese government to achieve the postcolonial apologia: 1) Resistant Western Hegemony, and
2) Chinese Interpretation of Western Ideology Strategies. The former one was to directly point
out the hegemony of the West. The Chinese government believed that the West, relying on its
national power, colonized third world countries and forcibly exported Western values, thus
bringing disaster to the whole world. The latter strategy was to add Chinese connotations to
ideology that the West uses to accuse China, such as human rights and democracy. Importantly,
in both strategies, China shifted away from the West as the key audience and towards a more
global audience, especially other nations who may feel subjugated to Western values, norms, and
institutions.
1) Resistant Western Hegemony
The Chinese government at this stage very clearly associated the entire US government
with hegemony and colonialism. The target of the attack shifted from a specific administration or
government to Western colonial heritage and hegemony. First of all, the Chinese government
laid out the history of Western hegemony and the bloody disasters it brought. In the interview,
Le Yucheng (2021) said that US accusations about other countries' human rights issue was
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absurd given the numerous human rights problems existing within the United States. He cited the
killing of indigenous people and racial discrimination against black people in the United States:
The United States and other Western countries are in no position to lecture us on
democracy or human rights. They all have a heavily stained human rights record.
Historically, these countries engaged in genocide against indigenous peoples and
discrimination and persecution against minority ethnic communities. During the United
States Westward Expansion after its independence, large numbers of native Americans
were slaughtered and dispossessed, causing their population to dwindle from five million
to a quarter million in just over 100 years. Native Americans were once the bulk of the
population in North America. Today however, they only account for less than two
percent of US population. And they were not given US citizenship until 1924. In Canada,
remains of over 200 dead children and more than 1,000 unmarked graves were found at
the sites of former residential schools for indigenous children. Over the past 160 years, at
least 4,000 Canadian children died at residential schools for no natural reason. Even to
this day, right inside the United States, people such as George Floyd still "can't breathe".
Minority groups remain victims of discrimination, and the homeless have to live on the
streets. How brazen it is that these countries have the courage to call themselves "human
rights defenders", lecture others on human rights, and talk down to or point fingers at
others. This is nothing but interference in other countries' domestic affairs in the name of
human rights (Le, 3).
Le used the same logic to counter U.S. government allegations of forced labor. He quoted
historical evidence of forced black slave labor: “the Americans might be more familiar with the
concept of 'forced labor', because it actually originates from slavery. For centuries in the US and
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European history, slaves were sold as property and mistreated, and had no dignity. When the
slaves in the US were forced to work, they had no personal freedom, no basic rights. And they
could not own the fruits of their work” (3). Le offered evidence of human rights issues in the
United States to prove two things. The first was that the West's accusations against China were
precisely based on hegemonism. Because the United States transplanted the disasters that
happened in its own country to China take-for-granted. They understood the situation in China
with their own logic, so as to firmly believed that the same disaster must have happened in
China. The second point was that because of the American hegemony, which brought disastrous
consequences, the logic of the United States was wrong and did not work.
Xie Feng (2021) also used the example of settler colonialism. "Historically, the United
States engaged in genocide against Native Americans. Presently, the United States has lost
620,000 lives because of its halting response to COVID-19... How can the United States portray
itself as the world's spokesperson for democracy and human rights" (1)? The difference was that
Xie shaped the human rights issues in the United States throughout the whole history by
comparing the massacre of Native Americans in the United States with the failure of the US
government to prevent and control the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a large number of
American citizens to die. Xie wanted to demonstrate that the United States itself always had
serious human rights problems, and therefore had no right to blame others if its own domestic
situation cannot be resolved.
Le then, went on to extend allegations of U.S. hegemony from domestic human rights
issues to expansion and colonization abroad. He said:
Ten years ago, the United States, citing human rights above sovereignty, started
intervention in countries like Syria and Libya. That was how the Arab Spring began. Now
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10 years on, where is that "spring"? How many people have become refugees and lost
their homes? Conflicts deprived these countries of 10 years that could have been used to
develop. And those who made the intervention, were they really to protect human rights
in these countries? I think they only produced human rights disasters! This is a hard
lesson that must be learned. Now people seldom talk about the Arab Spring, because
we've seen what happened - instead of a spring, there are wars, hunger and refugees. Such
tragedies shall never happen again. (Le, 3)
It is clear that by referring to the U.S. invasion of Libya and Syria, Le moved from responding to
and refuting U.S. allegations to seeking a global audience, especially third-world countries. By
invoking examples of US military interventions into other parts of the world, Le sought a
resonance in third world countries who were also oppressed by colonialism. In the current
context, the Chinese government gave up on conciliation with the Western world. As a result, the
purpose of apologia used by the Chinese government at this stage was not to repair the image in
international relations but to create a new international image for a new audience, namely third
world countries.
Le's statements can be thought of as a form of "constitutive rhetoric," which Maurice
Charland (1987) defines as the way persuasive discourse can call individuals into a particular
form of identity which then makes them part of the audience (134). By framing the US in
opposition to a group of other nations who are subjected to US hegemony, Le seeks to constitute
other nations as part of this postcolonial audience. “Some in the United States often talk about
strengthening "rules-based international order". The question is: what rules? And who makes
them? If it means the rules made by Western countries only, then they are made by only 12
percent of the world population, and they should not be the common rules for all. China's view is
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clear – we must uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order
underpinned by international law. This represents the shared aspiration of all countries and true
multilateralism in practice” (Wang, 3). Le also said "the rules by these small circles and groups
are at best for one-tenth of the world's population. In no way can they speak for the international
community. At the latest session of the UN Human Rights Council, over 90 countries expressed
support for China and said no to anti-China small groups. This is the voice of justice from the
international community. This is true multilateralism” (2). Their remarks were controversial in
some extent. On the one hand, they pointed out that the West accounted for only 12% of the
world's total population, so it was not qualified to make world rules and force other countries to
abide by them. On the other hand, they expressed their absolute support for the UN-centered
international system, even though the United Nations was a part of Western rules. This goes
directly to the second strategy used by the Chinese government, which is to carve out a space in
Western rules to incorporate Chinese interpretation.
In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, the object of the Chinese government's
decolonization was to resist the hegemonic public health discourse from the West and, thereby,
redefine the notion of global public health within a postcolonial frame. This is what I focus on in
the next strategy, the Chinese Interpretation of Western Ideology Strategies.
2) Chinese Interpretation of Western Ideological Strategies
After pointing out that the U.S. hegemony brought disaster to the world, the Chinese
government began to propose Chinese connotations for the words they believed were originally
Western-centric and colonial (human rights, democracy, etc.). As pointed out by many Asian
postcolonial scholars, de-Westernization from an Asian perspective is to enrich, not deny or
reject (Wang, 2011). Yoshitaka Miike (2003) argues in "Toward an Alternative Metatheory of
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Human Communication: An Asiacentric Vision" that an Asiacentric perspective requires
scholars to pay more attention to "struggles in Asian historical experiences in their attempts to
enrich the theoretical underpinnings of human communication problems, ethics, and
competence” (49). Miike (2006) later wrote in “Non-Western Theory in Western Research? An
Asiacentric Agenda for Asian Communication Studies” offers a more detailed view of
decentralization. He claims that “by focusing more on our cultural locations and generating more
culturally specific theories, communicologists will be better prepared to enrich the existing
Eurocentric body of knowledge and to explore the possibility of building truly universal
theories” (12). As a result, the Chinese government's decolonization of the West resonated to this
idea, to enrich, to remove the idea that the Western definition is the only definition and add
Chinese interpretation into existing Western-dominated world rules.
Le (2021) emphasized that human rights mean different things to different people. “If you
ask refugees from Syria and Libya which human rights they want, I think that they want their
basic living needs to be met: jobs and enough food. Even in the United States, different
populations have different needs. For George Floyd, the young man suffocated by the police, his
last demand was to breathe. For African Americans, human rights mean that 'black lives matter'.
For Asian communities in the United States facing unfair treatment or even threat of violence,
they simply want to be free from harm, fear and discrimination” (2).
Wang (2021) used the metaphor of Coca-Cola to point out the need for various
connotations of democracy. "Democracy is not Coca-Cola, the United States produces puree, and
the world has a taste. If there is only one model and one civilization on the earth, the world will
lose its vitality". He cleverly used Coca-Cola only having one taste in the world to satirize the
American ideological hegemony. Coke is a good metaphor because it was created in the United
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States, is popular worldwide, and the whole world has the same taste. This refers to the United
States selling its definition of democracy to the world and forcing the world to adopt the same
standards. Wang defined that not allowing non-Western countries to have their own connotations
of democracy is itself undemocratic. “It is undemocratic in itself to label China as ‘authoritarian’
or ‘dictatorship’ simply because China's democracy takes a different form than that of the United
States. Using democracy and human rights to conduct values-oriented diplomacy, meddle in
other countries internal affairs or stoke confrontation will only lead to turmoil or even disaster”
(2).
The Chinese government also defined who was eligible to assess democracy. Le believed
that "Democracy and human rights are not posters or slogans. They are not decorations for
window dressing. True democracy and human rights are about guaranteeing basic rights such as
employment, housing, food and clothing, education, health service, elderly care, etc. To judge
whether a medicine works, one does not look at its advertising but its efficacy. The logic is the
same for democracy and human rights....” (Le, 3). Le’s remarks implied that the arbiter of
democracy should be the people themselves, not governments from other countries.
As I mentioned before, the Chinese government's decolonization practice was not to
break the existing Western-centric international order itself, but to enriched a Chinese
connotation to the current rules and tried to leave a space which allowed other non-Western
countries can also enrich their own cultural interpretations to those rules. Therefore, I argue that
China's practice of decolonization during the COVID-19 period is a de-hegemonic process and a
dismantling of the view of the Western definition/understanding as the only/right one.
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Conclusion
Traditionally, apologia is understood in terms of defending oneself from accusations from
others. This traditional approach suggests the apologist is in a passive and accommodating role.
In this chapter, I attempt to explore ways that an apologetic stance can become more assertive
and, in ways, accusatory. What began as an attempt by the Chinese government to deny Western
claims of dishonesty and incompetence transformed into a broad and expansive critique of global
relations. Throughout this period, the Chinese government reframed the apologia to Western
allegations of the COVID-19 pandemic under the Biden presidency by taking an increasingly
aggressive stance. The Chinese government transitioned from the original reset frame of
proactively releasing cooperation invitations to the Biden administration, to a frame of political
strategic silence, and finally to a post-colonial apologetic frame.
In the first stage, the Chinese government tried to persuade Biden to rebuild cooperative
Chinese-US relations by erasing Trump’s undermining of the relationship proactively. At the
stage from the proposal to the official adoption of the Strategic Competition Act of 2021, the
Chinese government chose to remain silent to express its stance on mystery, uncertainty,
passivity, and relinquishment. When the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 was officially
passed, the Chinese government began to target Western hegemony itself and initiated to seek a
global audience. It was worth noting that the Chinese government did not oppose the existing
international order per se, but expressed its firm support. The Chinese government limited its
decolonization practice to resisting Western hegemony in the current international order while
trying to enrich Chinese cultural connotations to the current international rules. What needs to be
stated is that I marked the end of the postcolonial apologetic frame with the phone call between
President Xi and President Biden on September 10, 2021, in this thesis, since they expressed
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their intention to restart the dialogue and put aside their accusations against each other. But as of
April 2, 2022, when I am writing this chapter, China-US relations still not changed. The Chinese
government is still using the post-colonial apologia frame toward the United States.
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Conclusion
My thesis has provided a rhetorical analysis of the Chinese government's response to U.S.
accusations during the COVID-19 era. I examined how the Chinese government gradually
developed a postcolonial perspective apologia through a protracted debate and shifting
geopolitical context. In this conclusion section, I first briefly summarize my findings before
presenting the limitations of this study. Following this, I outline future research topics suggested
by this project. Finally, I consider the significance of this research to discussions of public
health, to rhetorical studies, and to me.
In general, I divided the Chinese government's self-defense rhetoric against Western
accusations during the COVID-19 pandemic into two major phases: the Trump administration
and the Biden administration. During the Trump administration stage, the Chinese government
first constructed a Community with a Shared Future for Humankind Frame to persuade the
Trump administration to use scientific language to talk about the virus while avoiding
politicizing the virus. When the Chinese government's initial attempts ended with the Trump
administration treating China more harshly, China shift to the Mirroring Western Accusatory
Rhetoric Frame to fight back by employing the Trump administration's own rhetorical strategies
against it. When the Trump administration defined the failure of Chinese-US diplomacy by citing
Nixon's remarks, the Chinese government also cited Nixon's discourse to prove the achievements
of the Chinese-US exchange. Similarly, when the Trump administration criticized the Chinese
government by differentiating between the CCP and the Chinese people, the Chinese government
was also differentiating between the Trump administration and the American people and accused
Trump of being the culprit in undermining Chinese-US relations.
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The Chinese government immediately turned to a reset frame when Biden won the
election to become the 46th US president. The Chinese government took the initiative to express
its willingness to cooperate with Biden by erasing Trump strategy and persuading Biden to lead
the United States back to normal Chinese-US relations. The Chinese government also defined the
connotation of cooperation to the Biden administration and painted a bright vision for ChineseUS cooperation proactively. And at the stage between the Act Strategic Competition Act of 2021
was proposed and passed, the Chinese government immediately switched from a reset frame to a
Political Strategic Silence Frame. After the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 was officially
passed, the Chinese government adopted a postcolonial apologetic frame to resist Western
hegemony. They began to practice decolonization and de-Westernization by resisting Western
hegemony, seeking a global audience, and adding Chinese interpretation to Western-dominated
world rules. In my view, the Chinese government is continuing to use this postcolonial strategy
in relation to the US and this shift represent an important development in Chinese-US relations.
Through a rhetorical analysis of the Chinese-US exchange during the COVID-19
pandemic, we can better understand why and how postcolonial apologia emerged. We can also
see the evolution of the Chinese-US relationship and the role China was expected to play in the
changing geopolitical environment. More importantly, we can take this as an example of how
third-world countries reflect and practice postcolonial critique and how they resisted the colonial
legacy of the West.
While I believe this thesis has made a good step towards achieving these goals, I know
that my research has limitations. Four major limitations are worth observing here. First, the study
focuses almost entirely on the Chinese side, ignoring the rhetorical analysis of the American
side. While I feel this is an important aspect of the thesis, in relation to exploring the non-
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Western perspective, it may also create a biased account. Some implicity bias may also come
from my own identity. As a Chinese international student living in the United States, I
acknowledge my subjective bias and general ignorance of American culture. I will rely on other
readers to determine if my analysis of these rhetorical frames are too influenced by my personal
history.
A second limitation may come from my focus on the stages of the COVID-19 pandemic,
rather than placing Chinese-U.S. relations in a larger, continuous dialogue. A longer study might
have benefited from a more robust and exhaustive consideration of Chinese-US relations on a
wider array of topics. A third limitation is that even though my purpose was to study the Chinese
government's rhetorical response to Western allegations during the COVID-19 period, my
research focused entirely on the US government's discourse and ignored the rhetoric of other
Western countries, such as the UK, France, Germany. Due to limitations of time and translation,
I positioned the US government as the primary speaker for the Western global order and this may
limit the understanding of the complexity of colonial and postcolonial relations. A fourth
limitation is that my research explores only the discourse of the government, especially the
remarks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I focus on the dialogue between the Chinese and
American governments. There are no other texts that analyze from different sources, such as
public opinion, news media, social media, or other institutions. This frames Chinese-US relations
only from the perspective of the government, without paying attention to other institutions.
Based on my purpose for writing this thesis and the four limitations I identified, I think I
have three outlooks for future research. First, I think rhetoricians should continue to respond to
Raka Shome's mission and continue to explore how rhetorical practices serve the process of
decolonization. We should also open up space for non-western perspectives, allowing third-
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world countries to enrich their intellect in rhetoric studies. Contemporary global relations offer
multiple topics around which such a postcolonial rhetorical project could be build, from global
trade to environmental policies. I hope that my study can contribute to the building of this
important connection between postcolonial theory and rhetorical studies.
My second suggestion is for more robust engagement with the rhetoric of international
responses to COVID-19. I think the COVID-19 pandemic has provided us with a very
comprehensive framework for understanding the development of international relations. We can
build a larger framework to analyze what role the Chinese government plays in the COVID-19
pandemic on the world stage and how it is achieved. We can explore China's exchanges with the
West, with third-world countries, with various international organizations, etc. And we must pay
attention to the continuity of the COVID-19 framework, and consciously add a post-pandemic
reflection perspective to discussions at all levels.
In addition to this, my thesis reinforces the point that a postcolonial perspective is critical
in public health studies. While I am not a public health scholar, I have tried to contribute to the
project of understanding the practice and implications of global health processes. I believe that
evaluating the Chinese government's pandemic prevention and control work from the perspective
of public health, especially how the Chinese government practices the decolonization and
decentralization of public health discourse, will be a direction worth exploring.
Finally, I would like to talk about what this research means to me. My research interest
has always been to discover some small frictions and oddness in my own life and then turn them
into an inquiry and try to figure them out. I was in my last semester of undergraduate in the US
when the COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in China. As a Chinese person living in the United
States, I am always sensitive to subtle changes in Chinese-US relations. I feel the unprecedented
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dynamics of China-US relations during the COVID-19 pandemic, which impacted my personal
life in every dimension. So I decided to dive into this study to find out what is going on between
China and the US. As I studied at the graduate level, I realized that the Chinese government's
response to the U.S. government in COVID-19 was gradually turning towards a systemic
resistance to the West, namely decolonization. So I started to look back at the whole process
from a post-colonial perspective, where I identified a way to analyze how the Chinese
government progressively crafted a postcolonial framework in the constantly updated ChineseUS relation, that is, post-colonial apologia. I define the process of writing this thesis as the
process of knowing myself. In the process of writing, I gradually gained a certain sense of my
own future research interests and fields. I know that decolonial studies and postcolonialism are
important to me because I want to question existing systems, reflect on hegemony and privilege,
examine power structures, to open up more space for the marginalized to have a voice. I also
realize that Chinese culture is important to me, it is my own cultural roots, and it is the weapon I
use to practice decolonization and reflect on hegemony. As I have attempted in this thesis, I want
to continue my path of decolonizing the field of rhetoric, using my non-Western perspective, to
enrich non-Western connotations in the field of rhetoric.
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